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Drufi Recommendation
on public perception of llrEU's contribution to stabilising democraqt in Albania 
-
reply to the annual report of the Council
The Assembly,
(, lmpressed by the massive show of solidarity wrth the Kosovar refugees on the part of European
public opinion and by the financial and human effort being made by humanitarian relief agencies to
alleviate their desperate plight and give them shelter under decent humanitarian conditions;
(ii) Stressing that it is essential for public opinion both to support the work WEU and its member
countries have been doing since 1997 with a view to helping to stabilise democracy in Albania, in
particular by dispatching the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE), and also to recognise that
it is necessary to increase the financial and human resources required for dealing with the dramatic turn
of events in Albania;
(iii) Noting with regret however, that the vast majority of the European public and media still know
next to nothing about WEU's activities in Albania;
(iv) Deeply perplexed, therefore, about the fact that neither the Secretariat-General, nor the Council,
nor the member governments are seeking to publicise more widely the success of the rvork being done by
MAPE which- among other things, has trained some 2 000 Albanian police officers since the start of its
mission;
(v) Failing also to understand why the Council, in adopting its emergency plan in February 1999 for
an international police operation in Albania 
- 
rvhich formed the basis for its decision in March 1999 to
extend the MAPE mission 
- 
did not use that opportunity to launch an extensive publicity campaign in
order to secure the necessary political support for the operation in question;
(vi) Recalling that it is particularly important for WEU's contribution to stabilising the situation in
Albania to be more widely debated in the parliaments of the member countries, particularly in view of
the need to make provision for similar action in Kosovo once the hostilities end,
RECOMMENDS THAT TT{E COI.]NCIL
l. Mount, as a matter of urgency, an effective publicity campaign providing information about
WEU and its activities in Albania and the Balkans so that they are better known and appreciated by the
public and parliaments ofthe WEU member countries and elsewhere;
2. Invite the member governments to intensifu the debate with the appropriate parliamentary bodies
so as to provide them with more information about the need to increase, where circumstances so require,
the technical, human and financial resources available to WEU for the purpose of helping to stabilise
the situation in the region in questiorq including effective police service in the refugee camps and at the
borders concerned;
3. Provide the Assembly with more regular and detailed information on this matter so that it can
support more effectively the efforts the Organisation is making in the Balkans.
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Erylanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mrs Pulgar, Rappofteur)
I. Introduction
l. Experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina
following the Dayton Agreement showed that
external military intervention in a civil war was
not sufficient to achieve a lasting peace accept-
able to all sides. Subsequent to humanitarian aid
being provided and peace-enforcement and stabi-
lisation measures being implemented, there fol-
lowed a new task of political and economic re-
construction. The future of peace in a region
such as the Balkans, marked by political and
economic insability, exacerbated by continual
internal and international armed conflict since the
early 1990s, will be determined by success or
failure in this task.
2. Like Bosnia and Herzegovina, though
under somewhat different circumstances, Albania
is keen, after four decades of virtual isolation and
eight years of continuing instability, to rebuild its
political and economic structures. The success of
this undertaking will determine the future stabil-
ity of the region. The partial opening up of bor-
ders and communications through television, the
press, radio and the lnternet, that have now be-
come established across the various Albanian
communities, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), make any
attempt to compartmentalise peoples put asunder
by historical forces yet bound by culture and
language a vain endeavour, other than in the
short term.
3. The armed conflict between NATO and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) over
the future of the province of Kosovo has direct
consequences for Albania, the extent of which
cannot be gauged as yet. Albania, which was
passing through a sensitive stage of defusing
political tension and social and economic recon-
struction, now finds itself in the front line of a
conflict for which it was unprepared, particularly
in humanitarian terms. The European Union, the
Council of Europe and the OSCE. as the crafu-
men of the reconstruction of civil society, have a
major responsibility for helping the country
through this time and making preparations for the
future of the part of the region to which the
country belongs.
4. Italyt and Greece, as fuIl members of the
EU and WEU, also have a frontline responsibil-
lty in this process, since the consequences of
instability in Albania and the region have direct
repercussions on their territories, in the form
either of illegal immigration or arrns and drugs
trafficking. Bilateral cooperation with the Alba-
nian Government plays an important part in
stabilising tlte internal situation and can have a
moderating influence on its current stance in the
conflict. The continuing development of eco-
nomic ties and trade between Albania and its
neighbours will have a beneficial effect on re-
gional stabilrty but in order to achieve this,
conditions must be created propitious to the suc-
cess of the reforns necessary for the country's
recoYery.
5. One of the main tasks that falls to gov-
ernments is to guarantee the security of people
and property alike. In Albania's case, the resto-
ration of a level of internal security is essential
for undertaking political and economic reform
and to improve the negative picture, by and large,
that the European media all too frequently paint
of the country and its people. The coverage given
in the media to the phenomenon of criminality
and the image portrayed of an all-powerful Al-
banian mafia are real obstacles to foreign in-
vesfinent. The absence of such investrnent merely
prolongs Albania's state of dependence on aid
and hinders economic development. Under such
circumstances and given the unstable political
context, the setting-up of a police corps, suitably
equipped and trained to use the West's modern
policing methods, will contribute towards
strengthening democratic institutions and creat-
ing the conditions necessary for achieving stabil-
ity in Albania.
6. The work undertaken by MAPE (W.EU's
Multinational Advisory Police Element) is central
1 Albania is the main beneficiary of dwelopment aid
from Italy. For the period 1998-2000, Italy has
earmarked projected assistance of some US$ 127
million, an amount which will no doubt be increased
because of the effects of the war in Kosovo. Source:
Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Main aspects of
Italian assistance to Albania (Rome, October 1998).
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to bringing about recovery. Although, militarily
speaking, WEU was not directly involved in
Operation Alba, its present task will no doubt
have a greater impact in the short and medium
term. Operafion Alba undoubtedly helped prevent
outright civil war and enabled the country to
move beyond a political impasse. Horvever it was
never intended to rebuild Albania. That enor-
mous task is one for the EU, the OSCE, the IMF
and the World Bank, donor countries and, to a
large exlent for Albania's neighbours, and also
depends on how the conflict in Kosovo develops.
II. The pyramidfinance crisis
and Operation Alba
(lanuary-April 1997)
7. Among the "socialist" states of central and
eastern Europe, Albania was a special case,
turned in on itself and set apart from the geopo-
litical manoeuvrings of the cold war. The regime
set up by Enver Hoxha was one of voluntary
self-sufficiency, intended to preserve the country
from external influence and guarantee internal
security. After Hoxha's death in 1985, Albania
moved into a transitional phase under the leader-
ship of Ramiz lJia and, in 1991, a new constitu-
tion was adopted that marked a progression to-
wards democracy. In April 1992, Sali Berisha
was elected President and his Democratic Party
took power.
8. Supported initially by the United States
and the European Union, specifically on account
of Albania's strategic importance in terms of the
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in an
attempt to forestall any crisis that might arise in
the province of Kosovo, attached to Serbia, and
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
both home to large Albanian communities, Presi-
dent Berisha's policies became increasingly
authoritarian. At the same time, notwithstanding
ex'ternal aid, economic decline led to a growing
number of Albanian citizens seeking work in
neighbouring countries, Italy and Greece espe-
cially.
9. ln 1994- the Albanian Government's do-
mestic policies hardened. Leading members of
the left-wing opposition Socialist Party, including
the former Prime Minister over the transitional
period, Fatos Nano, were accused of comrption
and, in the wake of a "political" tial, sentenced
to prison. The 1996 general election was marked
by inegularities, to t}re Democratic Party's ad-
vantage (it gained l0l of the 140 seats). The
OSCE, which had been asked to monitor the
elections, had noted the existence of fraudulent
practices but did not challenge the results. Never-
theless the United States and the European Union
lvere concerned by the consequences of the po-
litical instabilrty in Albania for the situation
within the region and, although critical of Presi-
dent Berisha, lent him their support.
10. In early 1997, under pressure from Euro-
pean and international sponsors, the Albanian
Parliament passed legislation intended to turn
round the economy and regulate the transactions
of finance companies that flourished in the 1990s
after Albania became open to the outside world.
Most of these operated so-called "pyramid fi-
nance" schemes whereby interest on sums depos-
ited was paid from the money brought in by new
deposits and from earnings on investments. Such
companies, for the most part, under the thumb of
Albanian and foreign organised crime, served
primarily for money-laundering purposes. Al-
though subject in theory to accounting controls,
the pyramid companies collapsed leaving most of
their customers with no hope of getting their
money back.
I l. For the majority of the population who had
already suffered the rigours of the tough eco-
nomic climate, final responsibility lay with the
govemment, which in its turn was unable to pay
compensation for losses incurred. Demonstra-
tions in protest broke out in all the major cities
and the police, overwhelmed, were obliged to
lvithdraw, in some cases leaving their equipment
in the hands of the demonstrators. The town of
Vlore, lvhere some of the larger finance compa-
nies had their 'headquarters", was at the centre
of the movement to challenge the government,
and President Berisha in particular, whose resig-
nation was called for. Economic discontent
turned into political protest, attracting the sup-
port of an unlikely coalition of political oppo-
nents of every hue (headed by the Socialist
Party), bereft savers (among them many civil
servants) and undenvorld organisations (taking
advantage of the confusion to tighten their grip
on their territory or dispose of their rivals).
12. Initially (between January and March) the
govemment and President Berisha tried to con-
tain the situation by clamping down hard on any
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unrest- but the disruption spread to parliament.
The United States and the European Union be-
came highly critical of Mr Berisha who, to ap-
pease the demands of the opposition- ended up by
sacking his Prime Minister. On 3 March, parlia-
ment re-elected Mr Berisha as President, but he
was forced to give ground politically and, on I I
March, appoint a Socialist Parcy member, Bash-
kim Fino, as Prime Minister. Outside Tirana the
situation worsened with "national salvation"
committees springing up and demanding the
President's resignation. Army and police arms
depots were ransacked and large numbers of
Albanians began to make for Italy across the
Adriatic Sea, as refugees but also with the inten-
tion of emigrating. The prospect of civil war tvith
wide-ranging regional consequences caused
Greece, Italy, the European Union, the Council
of Europe, the OSCE, NATO and WEU to take
stock of the situation, without agreement being
reached, however, on what the next step should
be.
13. Eventually, following a United Nations
Security Council Resolution2 a European stabili-
sation force under Italian command, known as
the Multinational Protection Force (MPF), was
set up and deployed on Albanian territory from
Api.l 1997, lvith the agreement of the Albanian
authorities. Operation Alba was launched, based
on a "coalition of the willing" comprising 11
states3 and formed outside NATO and WEU
structures.
III. Operation Alba and uction
to stobilise Albania
(April -August 1997)
14. Although the Albanian crisis was predict-
able. the reaction of European and international
institutions was initially marked by a degree of
indecision. In the first few weeks, during which
spontaneous rioting occurred, it still seemed as if
the government and Mr Berisha, as President,
could retain control. When the unrest took a po-
litical turn, the risk of a civil war emerged, with
the possibilrty of its extending into the Serbian
province of Kosovo. To the west, in Italy, the
2 Resolution ll0l,28 March 1997.
3 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy,
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey.
daily arrival of Albanian citizens in uncontrolled
numbers, aroused serious concern.
15. International mediation did not commence
until March when it became clear that the Alba-
nian Government had lost control of the situa-
tion. The southern ports lvere in the hands of the
insurgents, the arms taken from the army and the
police had been handed out among the populace,
the security forces lvere demoralised and divided
and militias made up of supporters or opponents
of President Berisha rvere being formed. The
Council of Europe, the OSCE and the European
Union redoubled their efforts to exert pressure to
achieve a political solution to the crisis. Media-
tion was also conducted through parliamentary
channels, by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe.
16. ln a Resolutiona it adopted on 29 January
1997, that same Assembly expressed disquiet at
the consequences of the stalemate reached in the
political situation in Albania5 and the likely re-
percussions on democracy and stability in the
country. It attributed responsibilit_v to both gov-
ernment and opposition alike. Two days earlier,
troops had been deployed in Tirana to counter
possible rioting in connection r,vith the pyramid
finance crisis which was spreading to other parts
of the country. On 19 February, when the gov-
ernment could no longer contain the crisis, which
was acquiring an increasingly political momen-
turrr, the President of the Assembly of the
Council of Europe, Mrs Leni Fischer, publicly
asked Albanian political leaders "to show re-
sponsibility in handling the crisis that followed
the collapse of pyramid investment schemes" and
acknowledged its political nature in stating that
"the problem today is that this financial scandal
exacerbates unresolved political tensions bet\,veen
govemment and opposition"6.
17. ln March 1997- following the proclama-
tion of a state of emergency (on 2 March), the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe decided to send an official delegation to
Albania to help restore civil order and contribute
a Resolution lll4 (1997) on honouring of oblig-
ations and undertakings by Albania; 29 lantary
t997.
s Albania became a member of the Council of
Europe on 13 July 1995.
6 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe:
press release dated l9 February 1997.
DOCUMENT 1650
to getting dialogue going between govemment
and oppositionT. This piece of parliamentary
diplomacy, together with initiatives taken by the
OSCE, the EU and the Italian Government,
helped get the political dialogue off the ground
once more. On 9 March 1997, President Berisha
agreed to the opposition being brought into gov-
ernment and to general elections being held the
following June. On I0 March, the Vlore insur-
gents carne together in a so-called "National
Salvation Commifiee" to hold talks with the Ital-
ian Ambassador to Albania, Paolo Foresti, and
said they were prepared to accept the terms of the
9 March agreement. On l1 March, a Socialist
Party member, Bashkim Fino, was appointed
Prime Minister. Notwithstanding these conces-
sions, violence and instability became endemic in
the south of the country while President Berisha
mobilised his support. On 12 March, Mr Fino
issued an appeal for international aid and nego-
tiations with the insurgents.
18. Europe's two defence organisations,
NATO and WEU, lvere monitoring events in
Albania but remained on stand-by; no decision to
intervene was taken or even seriously contem-
plated. While the OSCE, the Council of Europe
and the EU continued their shuttle diplomacy, the
internal situation went on deteriorating. On 15
March, President Berisha signed a pardon for
Fatos Nano, the unchallenged leader of the So-
cialist Party (released from prison the previous
day), in the hope that he could call a halt to the
political unrest. However, part of the opposition
had become radicalised and was preparing to
overthrow the President by force. At the same
time the number of Albanians landing in Italy,
brought there in boats controlled by criminal
elements- was nrnning into the thousands, re-
kindling the debate on the need for unilateral or
multilateral armed intervention in no uncertain
terms.
19. At Italy's request, on 28 March 1997, the
United Nations Security Council passed Resolu-
tion I l0l authorising the deployment of an
armed force whose mission would be to guaran-
tee security for the distribution of humanitarian
aid over a three-monttr period. After consulta-
tions with other European states held outside the
' Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;
press release dated 5 March 1997. The mission took
place from 5-7 March 1997.
traditional institutional frameworks, Italy as-
sembled the MPF and, with the approval of both
chambers of the Italian Parliament, Operation
Alba was implemented as from I I April. In an
unstable environment, it was intended to fulfil
three major objectives: ensure safe delivery and
distribution of humanitarian aid, take control of
the Adriatic ports from which refugees and other
would-be immigrants rvere leaving for ttaly and
stabilise the internal situation so as to allow
elections to take place in June 1997.
20. Over five months, the 7 000 or so men
under Italian command making up the MPF were
to succeed in attaining the required objectives in
an environment lvhich in principle was hostile to
them. The presence of the MPF prevented sup-
porters and opponents of Mr Berisha from
clashing elsewhere than in the political arena -
which would not have helped the Presidency -
and by controlling the Adriatic ports, it suc-
ceeded in containing the activities of the criminal
fraternity virtually without firing a shot. On 29
June 1997, the first round of parliamentary elec-
tions was held. Although the campaign was
marked by incidents, these did not prevent voting,
supervised by the OSCE, from taking place. On
l8 July, the final results were announced, with
victory going to the Socialist Party (99 seats out
of a possible 155 as against 29 to Mr Berisha's
Democratic Party). On 23 July, President Ber-
isha resigned and on 24 July, Rexhep Mejdani
(Socialist Party) rvas elected President of Alba-
nia. Operation Alba ended on I I August.
21. The lessons to be drawn from that opera-
tion were summarised by Admiral Guido Ven-
turoni, MPF Commander, at the ceremony com-
memorating the 50th anniversary of the Brussels
Treaty:
"Mission Alba was the first crisis-man-
agement mission conducted in Europe by a
multinational military force comprised of
Europeans only and, in my opinion, it
proved both the determination and the ca-
pability of the European countries to plan
and conduct peace-support operations in a
difficult situation like Albania.
But at the same time it was probably a
failure for existing European institutions.
I say this with regret, although ltaly was at
the helm, because a "coalition of the will-
6
DOCUMENT 1650
ing" should not be the preferred option for
future European crisis-management op-
erations.
It is an option and a workable one, some-
times the only possible solution, but in the
end it is certainly preferable to make use
of existing security organisations like
WEU or NATO and *reir (...) standing
Pol-Mil structures, rather than (...) ad hoc
arrangements, as in the case of Alba
(. 
. .)'."
IV The Multinational Advisory Police
Element (MAPE)
(May 1997 to date)
22. ln an interview with the Financial Times
in 1998, the WEU Secretary-General, Mr
Cutileiro, acknowledged that Albania had been a
missed opportunity for WEUe. In his address on
17 March, Admiral Venturoni confirmed the fact
in stating that, "The Albanian crisis, although
evident since January 1997, did not generate any
preventive action. As a matter of fact the slor.v
and somewhat hesitating response by the interna-
tional community and the Euro-Atlantic institu-
tions proved unable to prevent the crisis".
23. [n reality, the situation was a complex one
and there was no political consensus, in WEU,
the European Union or in NATO, on what course
to adopt. Despite the inegularities reported dur-
ing the 1996 elections and the authoritarian
stance adopted by the Albanian Government,
President Berisha continued to attract support
from some governments, through political affin-
lty or from a wish for regional stability. The
choice rapidly proved untenable when it became
obvious that the Albanian Presidency could no
longer control the situation and that the country
was heading for civil war. Successive interven-
tions by the Council of Europe and the OSCE
served as an illustration ofthose uncertainties, at
least until parliamentary elections were held in
June-July 1997.
1.1,1/EU andAlbania: the deployment of MAPE
24. The Albanian crisis did not escape WEU's
attention and the Organisation's politico-military
8 Brussels, 17 March 1998.
e 
"Europe's defence rookie awaits a call to action",
Financial Times,9 March 1998.
structures studied and put forward various inter-
vention scenarios, while awaiting any political
decision that might come. The WEU Assembly
was the first to speak out on Albania in Recom-
mendation 609, adopted by its Standing Commit-
tee on 13 March 1997.ln this text, addressed to
the WEU Council, the Assembly recommends
that it:
"(...)
3. Ask the Planning Cell to draw up con-
tingency plans for possible operations in
Albania covering the full range of Peters-
berg operations'o from humanitarian and
rescue tasks to peacekeeping tasks and
peacemaking, including control over the
restitution of arms and munitions".
25. On 14 March, the WEU Council, meeting
at the request of the French Presidency, tasked
the Politico-Military Group (PMG)r' with fol-
lowing up and evaluating the situation in Alba-
nia, with the support of the Secretariat, the
Planning Cell and the Satellite Centrerz. On 8
April 1997, the Politico-Military Group (PMG)
was tasked with a study of the experience ac-
quired by WEU during the police operation in
Mostar to see how it could be drawn upon to
rapidly set up a multinational advisory police
element in Albania.
26. On 17 April, the Council decided to send a
fact-finding mission to Albania whose aim would
be to study arrangements for the deployment of
an advisory police force and on 2 May, the Per-
manent Council decided to establish a multina-
tional advisory police element (MAPE) under
WEU authority with the task of advising on po-
lice matters in Albania. On 9 May 1997, on the
r0 These include humanitarian and rescue tasks
(evacuation of nationals), peacekeeping tasks and
tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peacemaking @etersberg Declaration, Part
II, paragraph 4; Bonn, l9 June 1992).
1r The Politico-Militarv Group (PMG) was estab-
lished in 1994 and is composed of national dele-
gations representing the political and military auth-
orities of the participant countries. It meets as and
when required to provide politico-military support to
the Council for all matters relating to WEU's oper-
adonal role in the framework of Petersberg missiors
and to the politico-military activities conducted
under the Council's authority.
r2 Internet: http:/www.weu.int/emcp/situation.htm.
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eve of the WEU ministerial meetings in Paris, a
draft mandate wErs submitted to the Council for
adoption. On 12 May, an advance police element
arrived in Tirana, where the situation had stabi-
lised since the arrival of an advance party for
Operation Alba. The terms of the MAPE man-
date endorsed by the Council on 13 May 1997
are as follows:
"Article 2:
(a) The MAPE will give the Albanian
police authorities the necessary informa-
tion and advice on appropriate aspects of
policing and restoring order. For the pur-
pose of training instructors, it will give
advice in the following areas:
organisation;
public order;
monitoring of borders;
logistics and communications,
The MAPE will advise the Albanian police
on their responsibilities in the electoral
process and will notifu WEU HQ, and the
OSCE, the Council of Europe and the
European Union, immediately of any defi-
ciencies that may constitute a threat to the
holding of free and fair elections.
(b) The MAPE will work mainly at a
high level of responsibility with the Alba-
nian police.
(c) The MAPE will be led by a Head of
Mission, who will report direct to the
WEU Council, notably by means of regu-
lar reports, and receive instructions and
political guidance from the Council.
(d) To ensure that the activities of the
MAPE are well integrated into the overall
intemational advice and support infra-
structure in Albania, the element will es-
tablish links with national and multina-
tional activities in this area and with the
MPF.
@ The first activity ofthe MAPE will be
to dispatch an advance party. The Head of
Mission and the advance party will keep
the situation under constant review in
preparation for the early arrival of the
main element, in particular by preparing a
Memorandum of Understanding with the
Albanian authorities in close consultation
r,vith all the other international missions".
27. On 24 June, a memorandum of under-
standing on third parry liability, defining the
procedures for compensation and settlement of
disputes between MAPE and the Albanian
authorities, was signed in Tirana. This agreement
was followed by the deployment of the WEU unit
on Albanian territory. On 22 July, at the initia-
tive of the German Presidency, the Permanent
Council decided to extend MAPE's mandate until
12 October 1997, and on 16 Sepember it was
extended for a further six months until 12 April
1998. The erlension was accompanied by a con-
cept for a long-term programme, due to be im-
plemented in stages. The Planning Cell was in-
structed to work out the details of this pro-
gr:mlme in which all 28 WEU states were entitled
to participate.
28. The main elements of the progr:unme are
as follows:
"(a) Advice
( ) the MAPE should contribute to the
development of an overall police concept
in close coordination with the Ministry of
the Interior (...).
@ Basic training
(...) it is recommended that a basic
training progr:unme lasing about three
months be conducted ( ..) in parallel with
continued 'train the trainer' activities. (...)
(c) Specialisedtraining
Taking into account the basic training
provided, the need for specialist training
should be assessed. ( ) Specialised
training should also include a 'train the
trainers' programme in order to enable the
Albanian police to gradually take over the
training programme.
(d) Evaluation
(...) It is recommended that evaluators be
deployed following completion of the first
three-month training cycle. This work will
involve visits to local police stations and
commissariats to evaluate whether the
training received is being put into practice.
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(e) Logistic and equipment support for
the Albanian police
Advice, trarning and evaluation will only
be fully effective when the Albanian police
have the necessary equipment and logistic
and in-frastructure support to sustain their
efforts. (...) A coherent equipment pro-
grtrrrlme, linked to training progress and
any other desired conditions (...) could be
coordinated by the MAPE. This work r,vill
be conducted in close cooperation with the
European Commission and other possible
contributors (...). Contacts with the Euro-
pean Commission have confirmed that
close cooperation in the implementation of
a long-term programme is envisaged. A
European Commission expert will provide
the MAPE with assistance on the matter".
29. MAPE has a staff of 95 officers from 23
WEU statesr3 and works in close conjunction
with the European Union, rvhich is heavily in-
volved in the Albanian reconstruction effort.
MAPE is funded mainly through the PFIARE
programme providing economic assistance to
central and eastern European countries. Its pres-
ence is readily accepted by the authorities and the
opposition and especially by those r,vho benefit
directly from the mission, namely Albanian po-
lice officers, !vho, given the lack of an arrny, are
the only security force with credibility 
- 
as the
events of September 1998 served to demonstrate.
2. MAPE'sfuture andthe impact
of the war in Kosovo
30. MAPE's mission started in a political
climate which lvas assumed to be moving to-
wards greater stability. However, since the June
1997 elections the intemal situation has contin-
ued its downward slide. The threat of inter-
Albanian armed conflict has faded but the
country is still suffering the backlash from that
period. The new Socialist majority and the
Democratic Party opposition, after a short truce
under the scrutiny of the European organisations
(EU, OSCE and the Council of Europe), returned
to their old confrontational ways 
- 
at times with
13 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia.
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom.
violent overtones. While the situation in Kosovo
and the massive influx of ethnic Albanian refu-
gees have temporarily stopped feuding between
these two factions, partisan tensions could
equally well be fuelled by a prolongation of the
lvar.
31. An unspecified number of weapons is still
in circulation, despite campaigns for their recall
and threats of forcible confiscation. Illegal emi-
gration, under the control of the underworld, to
Italy and other lvestern European countries con-
tinues, alongside drugs and arms trafficking.
Some weapons have been diverted to Kosovo to
equip the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) forces
and the rise in violence in that Serbian province
led to fear of a flood of Kosovar refugees and
conflict between Albania and the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Indeed, this is effec-
tively lvhat has been happening, since NATO air
strikes began over FRY territory.
(a) MAPE's importance in developing
WEU's ope rati onal capabi I i ti e s
32. WEU's police mission has had a beneficial
effect not just on Albania but also on the Organi-
sation. This is something of a consideration
since, once again, it is a matter of regret that an
operation such as this has failed to catch the
public eye in WEU member states and the other
countries that hold various categories of status
rvithin the Organisation. MAPE's presence on
the ground placed WEU in the'front line of the
developing crisis that has meanwhile turned into
the conflict in Kosovo. Stabilisation of the inter-
nal situation in Albania remains a prioriry- but is
also largely dependent on the regional context.
33. As a result of MAPE's work there has
been greater cooperation betrveen WEU and the
European Union and NATO, which, having
moved beyond the framework of discussions or
purely theoretical exercises, is now taking place
in real conditions, in a complicated and unstable
environment. The Planning Cell, Situation Cen-
tre. Military Committee and Satellite Centre are
all carefully monitoring the situation in Albania
and Kosovo and improving the work carried out
by MAPE.
34. Thus, on l0 July, the Council tasked the
Military Staff to prepare a feasibility study on
possible options for an international police op-
eration in Albania to assist the Albanian Gov-
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enrment in its tasks of maintaining public order
and exercising its customs functions. (...) On-
going reflections rvithin NATO would be taken
into account and duplication of work avoided.
35. Noting the relevant feasibility study- on 29
September the Council tasked the Military Staff
to further explore ways to widen and better focus
the geographic and functional scope of WEU's
support for the maintenance of law and order,
given the necessary security conditions and ma-
terial and financial support. Along with the
Council Decision on an Initial Planning Direc-
tive, approved on 20 October, the relevant docu-
ments were transmitted to the EU and NATOta.
36. On l0 November, the Permanent Council
approved a set of PMG (Politico-Military Group)
recommendations "relating to a mid-term review
of MAPE's current mandate, thus identifying
lvays to focus MAPE'S work more closely on key
priorities for the training and modernisation of
the Albanian police"r5. The following me:Nures
were approved:
a new training concept based on the
integration of MAPE training into the
existing training programmes of the
Police Academy.
increasing the information flolv be-
tween the head of the MAPE Mission
and the Council,
a constant evaluation of the results
achieved in terms of involvement of
Albanian police officers in MAPE ac-
tivities,
the reinforcement of relations with in-
ternational organisations and bilateral
missions operating in Albaniat6.
37. Following an initiative by the ttalian
Presidency, on 27 October 1998, the European
Commissioner responsible for humanitarian af-
fairs, Ms Emma Bonino, was invited to address
the Permanent CouncilrT. Several 5t,ggestions she
ra Second part ofthe forty-fourth annual report ofthe
Council to the Assembly on the activities of the
Council for the period I July to 3l December 1998.
Assembly Document 1641, 8 April 1999, page 4.
" Idrm.
'6 ldem,page to.17 This was the first time that a member of the
European Commission had addressed WEU's
made have been subsequently taken up and im-
plemented (for instance: information-sharing with
the Situation Centre, collaboration with the Sat-
ellite Centre). On 7 Novernber 1998, members of
the European Community Humanitarian Office
(ECHO) gave a briefing to the Military Staff on
organisational and procedural issuesr E.
38. From the second half of 1998- monitoring
the situation in Kosovo acquired an increasingly
important place in WEU action in Albania, since
the crisis there has major repercussions on Al-
banian internal policy. The Democratic Party has
taken up cudgels on the side of the armed
struggle and an independent Kosovo, while the
govemment led by Fatos Nano banked on an
improvement in relations with the FRY, FYROM
and Greece 
- 
all opposed to such a political op-
tion or with reservations on that score. Moreover,
the border between Kosovo and Albania is adja-
cent to areas won over to Mr Berisha's Demo-
cratic Party, lvhere the government has not suc-
ceeded in establishing its authority. The constant
flow of refugees, most of whom concentrate close
to the border, and the overt presence of KLA
(UQK)'' and FARK20 forces has added to the
instability within the country caused by appre-
hension about what action either the opposition
or the government may take in order politically to
gain the upper hand.
39. In July 1998, the WEU Council "tasked
the MS (Military Staff) to prepare a feasibility
study concerning a possible extension to the
MAPE Mission in Albania. The study rvas dis-
cussed on24 luly 1998, and the MS was tasked
to produce a more detailed study. The revised
study- which presented the Council with three
main options, two requiring the deployment of an
international military force to provide a secure
Permanent Council.
rE Second part ofthe forty-fourth annual report ofthe
Council to the Assembly on the activities of the
Council for the period I July to 3l December 1998.
Assembly Document 1641, 8 April 1999, page 13.
re Kosovo Liberation Al'my (Ushtria Qlirintare E
Kosoves). The KLA appears to have been founded in
the course of the 1980s and made its first public
appearance in Kosovo in June 1996.
'0 Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo, knownby the acronym FARK (Forcave .Armalosure
Republikes e Kosoves). Reputedly close to the
Democratic Part_v, the FARK appqlr to have been
formed in 1998 by KLA dissidents.
l0
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environment, was examined by the Council on 29
September 1998. Additional details and a pos-
sible reduction in the options rvere requested. A
supplement to the feasibihlv study has since been
prepared, setting out the military implications of
the various options and introducing certain
modifications to the original range of possibili-
ties. These exlended from providing training and
advisory teams in the 12 Police Directorates, to
deploying advisors country-wide down to police
unit level. Following the issue of an Initial Plan-
ning Directive by the Council on 28 September
1998, a draft Contingency Plan and a Declara-
tion of lntent Request (DIR) Message were
drawn up and circulated to the WEU nations on
13 November 1998, with the approval of the
Council"2r. The collating and study of replies to
the DIR message is still continuing.
40. The Satellite Centre is also involved in
planning WEU activities in Albania and Kosovol
On 26 November 1998, the Permanent Council
"tasked the Centre to carry out general security
surveillance of the Kosovo region with particular
emphasis on the state of implementation of the
agreements signed in Belgrade on 16 October
1998 between the FRY and OSCE and on 15
October 1998 between the FRY and NATO, as
well as on the situation of refugees and displaced
persons and of the related ffiastructure. This
task was put forward following a request from
the European Union, based on Article J 4.2 of the
Treaty on European Union, on monitoring of the
situation in Kosovo"z'. The EU, NATO and the
OSCE were given access to satellite imagery
dossiers prepared according to procedures devel-
oped by the WEU Space Group.
41. Since the start of its mission, and working
within somewhat restricted budgetary guidelines
relative to its real needs, MAPE has trained some
2 000 police officers at the Tirana training
centre23. On 2 February 1999, the Permanent
Council decided to extend MAPE's mandate for
another year (until April 2000) with the possibil-
21 Second part ofthe forty-fourth annual report ofthe
Council to the Assembly on the activities of the
Council for the period I July to 3l December 1998.
Assembly Document 1641, 8 April 1999, page 10.
" Idem,page 15.
23 WEU: Press Release No 9/99, 9 March 1999. A
second training centre was opened in Durr6s on 9
March 1999.
rty of a further extension. In April 1999, the
Permanent Council assigned the MAPE com-
mand to General Pistolese of the Italian
Carabinieri.
42. Far more than a mere police advisory
mission, WEU action in Albania made it possible
for the Organisation to improve its planning,
crisis-monitoring and crisis-management proce-
dures, in cooperation with the EU, NATO and
the OSCE. However, regrettably, the mission has
not received the publicity it deserves in view of
the importance of its contribution to stabilising
Albania, without which that nation, faced with
having to deal with the consequences of the war
in Kosovo, would today be in an even more diffi-
cult situation. This failure to gain media attention
considerably reduces WEU's political visibility,
especially in the present context, and hardly adds
to its credibility in the European defence debate.
(b) The importance of pttblic supportfor
acfion taken by WEU
43. As far as Albania is concerned, MAPE
action went beyond the context of mere technical
assistance; it could be perceived as the expres-
sion of a European policy for bringing stability to
Albania and minimising the risks to that country
of a major confrontation over Kosovo, not just
between Kosovars and the Serbian authorities,
but also between NATO and the FRY. MAPE
was part of a far wider effort on the part of the
European Union and the OSCE to help Albania
reform its institutions and resume the path of
economic development, without which any at-
tempt to prevent Albanians leaving their ou,n
country is unrealistic. Today- in the absence of a
foreseeable outcome to the Kosovo problem
(autonomy, partition or immediate or gradual
independence) a solution needs to be found to the
problems of an entire region, with the common
ground between them, referred to earlier, being
the creation or carving out of an Albanian
homeland in south-eastern Europe.
44. Reconstruction of the police force is an
essential prerequisite for the proper foundation of
the rule of law in a country that is armed to the
teeth and, because ofinternal disorder and exter-
nal factors (such as economic sanctions against
the FRY or crisis and lvar in Kosovo), without
any real economic prospects in the short term.
Under such conditions, action taken by MAPE
can only be successful in the medium to long
ll
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term. [n the present circumstances it seems wise
to extend its mandate and widen it to cover man-
agement and monitoring of humanitarian aid for
refugees from Kosovo indefinitely, and to in-
crease material and human resources. Maintain-
ing and reinforcing MAPE is more than ever
essential in a country where political debate can
turn into armed confrontation as happened during
the disturbances of August-September 1998.
45. For this, it is absolutely essential to obtain
massive public support for the work WEU has
started to do in this connection. This is particu-
larly important in view of the need to foresee and
plan now for appropriate measures to be taken to
restore order and peace in Kosovo when the
hostilities end and the refugees return. WEU
should play an important role at this point, on the
basis of the experience it has gained in Mostar
and Albania.
46. Holvever, there has been practically no
reference in public discussion or in the media to
the advisability of making use of WEU and its
experience of policing to assist inthe post bellum
process of stabilisation and democratisation in
the Kosovo war zones. There is talk of United
Nations police units, of the OSCE, but not a
word about WEU. One of the reasons for this is
the almost total lack of public information on
WEU's contribution to the stabilisation of lalv
and order and democracy in Albania since May
1997. Neither the Secretariat-General, nor the
Council, nor the member governments have so
far made any significant effort to keep members
of parliament and the media adequately informed
of the scale of WEU's action in Albania or to
seek the necessary public support for it.
47. The Secretariat{eneral has issued five or
six short press releases on Albania and MAPE
since 1997 but unless such communications are
accompanied by a more energetic publicity cam-
palgn, they sink without trace among the innu-
merable items of information reaching the media
every day.
48. The second part of the forty-fourth annual
report of the Council contains a certain arnount
of information on MAPE but it is too general for
members of the Assembly to use to give public
support to the Organisation's efforts in this area.
49. The Bremen Declaration contains a short
paragraph on MAPE to the effect that:
"Ministers underlined the importance of
the exlended mission, on the basis of Ar-
ticle L4.2 of the Treat_v on European Un-
ion, of the WEU Multinational Advisory
Police Element (MAPE), in supporting the
process of stabilisation and democratic re-
form in Albania. MAPE's enhanced geo-
graphical coverage and increased opera-
tional mobility will enable MAPE to better
respond to the needs of the Albanian
authorities in building a police force ac-
cording to European norms".
50. This is an extremely important decision
that would merit detailed explanation to the pub-
lic. But it was not through WEU but from a no-
tice in the Official Journal of the European Union
published on 9 March that it r,vas learned that the
Permanent Council of WEU had already, on 2
February 1999, adopted an emergency plan for
an international police operation in Albania,
which formed the basis for an official request
from the European Union to WEU, on 9 March
1999, to prepare and implement a joint action
pursuant to Article J.4.2 of the Maastricht
Treaty, including an enlarged MAPE mission in
Albania. The only information to come from the
WEU Council r,vas a short press release issued on
9 March 1999, stating that "a new MAPE train-
ing centre was officially opened at Durres on
Tuesday, 9 March".
51. Communications of that sort give no idea
of the importance and scope of the nelv police
mission in Albania. The Council has therefore
once again missed an oppoffunity to obtain the
necessarv public support for its actions by
mounting an effective publicity campaign. At
present, it is primarily members of the Assembly
who are making remarkable efforts to alert the
public to the situation and in the regions con-
cerned. The President of the Assembly and a
delegation of the Presidential Committee took the
lead, with the Chairman of the Committee for
Parliamentary and Public Relations, and set an
example with their recent visits to Albania and
FYROM and their reports not only to the
Council but also to the media. Several members
of the Assembly have also made remarkable
efforts in writing articles that have appeared in
the international press, notably the President of
the Assembly. Mr de Puig. one of its Vice-Presi-
dents, Mrs Durrieu, the Chairman of the Political
t2
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Committee, Mr Baumel- and the Chairman of the
Defence Committee, Mr de Decker.
V Conclusion: the needfor o publicity
compaign to accompany a European policy on
soutlt-eastern Europe
52. The Albanian people have been dispersed
throughout the Balkans since the Balkan Wars at
the start of the century. The lveakness of the
''Kingdom of the Eagles" relative to its neigh-
bours has not been conducive to finding a real
solution to the problems of the Albanian dias-
pora. The Albanian People's Republic's self-
imposed isolation in the post-war period, in the
face of the cold war and attempts to destabilise it
on the part of the Yugoslav Federation in the
1950s, put the "Albanian question" on hold. It
lvas taken up again in the 1960s and 1970s by
the Kosovar Albanians- demanding that Kosovo
should have the status of a republic within the
Federation. After violent clashes, the solution of
an autonomous status for the province lvas
agreed, but in 1989 that status was abolished. It
would also be true to say that relations between
Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo have always
been marked by mutual suspicion and fear and
religious prejudices on both sides of the com-
munlty divide. The aim of the independence
movement was not to create a multinational state
with an Albanian majority but an Albanian state
that would merge rvith present-day Albania. ul-
timately with the possibility of Albanians from
FYROM being dralvn into a Greater Albania. If
this aim were to become a reality it would also
have repercussions for other neighbouring states
with ethnic Albanian minorities, frequently con-
centrated in areas bordering on Albania (northern
Greece and the Italian region of Puglia, around
Bari, for example).
53. The conflicts in the Balkans have radical-
ised the Kosovar communities for some time to
come and, notwithstanding the present emphasis
in diplomatic thinking, the lvay out of the present
crisis is through independence for the entire area
or a division of territory between the tlvo sepa-
rate communities with de facto independence for
Kosovar Albanians. What is very worrying is the
Iack of a common European resolve and of anyjoint preparatory initiative to ensure post-war
conditions are as good as they can made to be,
avoid another Kosovo in FYROM and draw
Serbia and Montenegro into the process of
bringing about greater convergence between the
EU and the central and eastern European coun-
tries. Calls for a conference on south-eastern
Europe or the launch of a Marshall Plan for the
Balkans make comforting reading in newspapers
and are reassuring to public opinion across the
states of the European Union lvhich is concerned
about what will happen when the lvar is over.
However they beg the question of where to find
statesmen of vision equal to that of a Marshall, a
Schuman, a Monnet or a Spaak, able to come up
with ideas to put to the countries of the region
that represent an alternative to well-worn IMF or
World Bank formulae and rigid compliance with
"macroeconomic balances", which are the hall-
mark of developed economies but which have
proved to be of limited value when it comes to
guaranteeing public stability and security, with-
out which there can be no lasting economic de-
velopment.
54. It is not a matter of reconstruction but of
establishing genuine rule of law and a social,
economic, cultural and security fabric that allows
the peoples of the region to flourish in an envi-
roffnent of respect for their different cultures,
traditions and beliefs. This obviously presup-
poses not only that the financial means are there
but also that sensible use is made of them within
a planned framelvork, in partnership lvith local
representatives ofthe public and private sectors,
not simply and solely with govemments. Euro-
pean political and economic agencies have a
major responsibilrty here and resources must not
be friuered away, as has been allolved to happen
over the past ten years. Each organisation has its
special characteristics which should be used,
although duplication must be avoided. The EU
has economic capabilities. The Council of
Europe, through its Conventions on human
rights, minority rights and regional languages,
and its legal expertise, has a central role in es-
tablishing the rule of law and civil society. The
OSCE is able to deal rvith the wider aspects of
security matters and use the experience it has
acquired within the region in the area of confi-
dence-building and arms and forces reduction.
NATO is able, through its various partnership
programmes, to deal lvith armed forces reorgani-
sation, a task that WEU could share,' where
preparations for involvement in Petersberg-type
operations are concerned.
l3
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55. The expertise acquired by a group such as
the Friends of Albania (FoA), lvhich was set up
in 1998, may be useful in bringing about a rsturn
to stability and for economic development in
south-eastern Europe. The group, which operates
lvithin the OSCE framework and brings together
23 states and eight international or Europe-wide
organisations'o was officially formed in Brussels,
on 30 September 1998. The FoA's objectives are
"to reinforce and focus international attention in
supporting Albania in its efforts to consolidate
the democratic process, achieve stabilit-v and
securit-v and further economic development.
56. Political rvill and adequate financial re-
sources are two essential elements in any strategy
for rebuilding south-eastern Europe. This must
produce results for the peoples concerned as
quickly as possible; otherwise the situation, after
a period of sustained interest, runs the risk of
degenerating into a spiral of economic and politi-
cal instability, exacerbated by the after-effects of
war. This is a challenge all the institutions rvith
the necessary resources and technical expertise
will have to face. As to human resources, these
exist in the region already. There is no need
therefore to "export" bureaucrats, "experts" and
other consultants who are not ansrverable for the
options they advocate and cannot be held to
account in the event of failure. Four years after
2a The Friends of Albania's first meeting at senior
civil servant level, held in Rome, on 23 October
1998, was attended by representatives from France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Romania, Russian Fed-
eration, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United States,
the Council of Europe's Venice Commission
@uropean Commission for Democracy through
Law), EBRD, the European Commission, the EU
Presidenry, IMF, NATO, OSCE, WEU, and the
World Bank.
Dayton, Bosnia is still a disaster area. Albania,
despite having been the recipient of every con-
ceivable form of aid over tle past seven years" is
chronically unstable and its economy almost
wholly underdeveloped with no prospect lvhatso-
ever of improvement in the short term, a situation
exacerbated by the fall-out from the war in Kos-
ovo. The Albanian people and the peoples of
south-eastern Europe deserve sound, skilled ad-
vice and assistance from those who speak on
behalf of a Europe of which they have ever been
and are still an integral part.
57. That endeavour will have to be accompa-
nied by a much more systematic and determined
drive in the area of communications policy by the
govenrments concerned, if they really want the
electorate to support the action that is necessary
to stabilise the region and, in particular, any call
for an increase in financial and human resources
in this connection. This is above all a major
challenge for WEU and its Council. If the
Council does not make a greater effort to seek
public support for its action in Albania, the
widespread opinion not only in the media but also
among many political leaders in Europe that
WEU serves no useful purpose may result in it
being completely left out of the international
community's efforts to restore order and peace in
Kosovo in the post-war period.
's Between 1992 and 1998, the amount of aid from
European, international, bilateral and otler sources
is said to have totalled some 2 billion euros (see fact
sheet at Appendix I). Over the period l99l-98, the
EU made a contribution estimated at €700 million
(for all types of aid programme).
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APPENDIX I
Surface area 28748
(km)
Populatlon 3.25
(millions)
Populadon density I 15
(inhab./ kn)
Fertllity rate 2.7
(91oo)
Life expectancy 7l
GNP
[]'"1ffi1[,t'rrions 
or$) 
'r;t
Fact sheet on Albania
GEOGRAPHIC POSITION AND SURFACE AREA: 28 748hrf .
Located betlveen the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY: Serbia and Montenegro), Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Greece, bounded by the Adriatic Sea to the west.
POPULATIONT: 3 249 000 inhabitants (estimated mid-year population for 1995. Last census in
1989 indicated 3 182 000). Age structure:0-14 years: 32.9%.;15-64 years:50.9%;65 years and over:
9.2%
DIASPORA: 6 million (Kosovo, FYROM. Greece, Italy, Switzerland, United States, Germany).
LANGUAGE: Albanian
CURRENCY: new lek (in 1998: 100 new leke = €0.6)
CAPITAL: Tirana (population 500 000 inhabitants according the last estimate in 1995)2.
Administrative divisions: 3 6 districts.
RELIGIONS: According to the 1998 Constitution, which guarantees religious freedom, the Republic
of Albania has no official religion. At present, alarge section of the population is muslim.
HISTORY: ln 1912, after four centuries of Ottoman domination, Albania proclaimed its independence
in Vlore (in the south). The country was governed from 1925 to 1939 by President Ahmed Beg Zoga,
later proclaimed King Zog. It was forcibly annexed to the Italian "empire" in 1939, brutally invaded by
the Wehrmacht in 1943, and regained independence tn 1944, with the help of the Soviet Union.
Enver Hoxha founded communist Albania in 1946.
After severing ties with Moscow in 1961, Albania tumed towards Beijing.
ln 1977 - after breaking offrelations with China, Albania found itself totally isolated from the rest of the
world. Enver Hoxha's system of socialist autarchy was to last until his death in 1985.
In 1990 and l99l- his successor Ramiz Alia was confronted with growing popular protest, which was
put down by the authorities. Thousands of Albanians tried to flee the country. Under pressure from the
people, Alia introduced reforms leading to the demise of communism.
t http://www.undp.orglpopin/regionaUeurope/index.htm Regional Population Inforntation Europe, National
Report submitted by the Government of Albania CES/PAU/1998114, 9 November 1998, Regional Population
Meeting, Budapest, 7-9 December 1998.
2 ibid.
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ln 1991, Albania opened up to the rest of the world, but its regional importance lvas only really
recognised with the eruption of the Balkan crisis. The United States, Germany and Italy placed their
hopes in Sali Berisha's Democratic Party which came to power in April 1992.
Sali Berisha's election to the presidency marked the start of a second phase of political and economic
transition fraught lvith conflict.
1994 saw the beginnings of nelv unrest. In May 1996, the organised chaos of the parliamentary
elections led to violent demonstrations around the country. The collapse of the pyramid finance
companies led to a massive wave of popular protest, which was supported by the Socialist Party.
Following mediation by ltaly and the international community, the Govemment gave way to a coalition
of national unity which prepared the elections of 29 June 1997 under the leadership of the Socialist
Bashkim Fino.
After numerous difficulties, the UN Security Council finally gave its authorisation for Operation Alba
(Resolution 1101, 28 March 1997), the aim of which was to provide humanitarian aid and protection to
OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) observers. WEU has had a Multinational
Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Albania since 1997, advising on police training.
There have since been tlvo changes of govemment.
POLITICAL SITUATION: The President is Rexhep Mejdani (Socialist Pa.ty), who rvas elected by
parliament on24 Jtly 1997 for a five-year term.
Prime Minister Pandeli Majko (Socialist Pa.ty) leads a left-wing coalition govenunent.
Legislature: single-chamber People's Assembly, 155 seats, to which members are elected for a 4-year
term, most by direct popular vote and some by proportional vote.
FOREIGN POLICY: Albania was zrmong the first former communist countries to join NATO's
Partnership for Peace in 1994. It was admiued to the Council of Europe in 1995. Since the end of the
cold war, Albania has been moving towards a policy of developing its diplomatic relations. Since 1992,
it has made Euro-Atlantic integration the focus of its foreign policy. For that purpose, it has
strengthened its ties with ltaly and considerably improved its relations with Greece. These countries are
Albania's two main economic partners.
Between 1994 and 1996, Albania joined a number of international forums: Central European Initiative
(CEI): Balkan Conference on Stabilit_v, Security and Co-operation in south-east Europe (July 1996);
South-east European Co-operative lnitiative SECI (December 1996) and Process for Stabilrty and Good
Neighbourliness in south-east Europe, an EU initiative known as the Royaumont initiative, (December
lee5).
In 1998, the conflict between Serbians and Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo had
repercussions for Albania. The country has had to take in about 371 0003 refugees from the province
since the start of the NATO air strikes. This massive influx of refugees threatens to upset the delicate
balance between north and south in Albania. The demographic weight of the poorer and more dansely
populated north will receive a considerable boost from the flood of refugees from Kosovo or any future
unification of the two regions. When he was in polver betrveen 1992 and 1997, former President Sali
Berisha, now leader of the opposition, passed a larv on citizenship under which all Albanian immigrants,
'Figures at 29 April 1999. Source UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm.
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including Albanians from Kosovo, lvere granted the right to apply for Albanian citizenship and
Albanian passportsa.
MILITARY MANPOWERS: (1998 est.) availability:749 633 
- 
fit for military service: 609 986 
-
reaching militar-v age annually:32 367 .
ALBANIAN PRESENCE IN ITALY: according to ISTATU figures published on I January 1998.
72 551of the I 240 721 residence permits issued to foreigners law.fully residing in Italy rvere granted to
male Albanian immigrants. And 13 800 of the 22 853 to arrive in Italy landed in the region of Puglia,
most of them Albanians.
The crisis in Kosovo has brought an increase in the numbers seeking asylum. In 1998, 4835
applications lvere filed by Albanians and Kosovo Albanians betrveen I July and 30 September,
compared with 1869 in 1997 . More than 60Yo were rejected.
The Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera estimates that some 8 000 immigrants have landed in Puglia
since the outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans. about 80% of them refugees from Kosovo. The highest
number of arrivals recorded so far was 13 89 on 27 April 1999 .
MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT:
Prime Minister PandeliMajko (SP)
Agricultural and Food Lufter Xhuveli (AP)
Culture. Youth and Sports Edi Rama (Independent)
Defence Luan Hajdaraga (SP)
Education and Science Ethem Ruka (SP)
Finance Anastas Angleli (SP)
Foreign Affairs Paskal Milo (SDP)
Health Leonard Solis (HRUP)
Information Musa Ulqini (SP)
Justice Thimio Kondi (Independent)
Public Order Petro Koci (SP)
Labour and SocialAffairs Kadri Rrapi (SP)
Local Government Arben Demeti (DA)
Public Economy and Privatisation Ylli Bufi (SP)
Public Affairs and Transport Ingrid Shuli (SDP)
Economic Cooperation and Trade Ermelinda Meksi (SP)
Institutional Reforms Arben Imami (DA)
o IVEU and crisis management in the Balkans, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr
Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1627, 9 November 1998.
s http ://www. strafor. com./kosovo/albania.htm?section=2.
u Istituto di studi statistici Italiano.
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APPENDIX II
T'he Albunian economy
In five years, Albania has moved from being a totally plarured and isolated economy to a market economy.
The strong growh in the Albanian economy between 1992 and 1996, with GDP increasing 45% in real terms,
was suddenly cut short by the "pyranxd crisis". The optimistic-soundfurg figures concealed a very different
picture, a permanent trade deficit propped up by transfers from Albanians abroad.
The financial crash in January 1997, caused bv the collapse of the "pyr4mid invesfinent schemes",
dragged the country into an economic and political crisis (January-July 1997) which brought it to the brink of
bankruptcy and civil war.
Owing to the wealaress of the country's institutions, the 1997 crisis took on unprecedented dimensions. In
orderto prwent a r@rrrence, the Albanian Govemmenthas emba*ed on a strategy of political, economic and
social reforms. The key points in the strategy are (i) to normalise the political structure and introduce
democracy; (iy' to restore orda; (iii) to deal with the poverty caused by the 1997 crisis: (iu) to sabilise the
macro-economic factors; (u) to reform the financial sector and manage the consequences of the pyrarrud
schemes; nd (vi) to privatise the sfiategic sector. The Public Invesfinent Programme @IP) for 1998-2000
reflects the main features of that strategy. The financial resources of the PIP amount to the equivalent of
approximately US$ 350 million 80% in the form of aid and foreign fade credits. The Albanian Govemment
contribution in 1998 lvas approximately US$ 50 million. Albania's principal financial parhers are the
European Commission (PHARE Programme: US$ 289 million to the end of 1997) and the Wortd BanMDAT
(US$ 273 million from 1992 on- 197 million forthe PIP). Bilateral aid amounting to US$ 490 million in the
period 1992-1997 was granted by the USA (US$ 163 million), Germany (US$ 107 million), Italy (US$ E2
million dollars), Japan (US$ 58 million), Switzerland (US$ 46 million); Kuwait (US$ 23 million).
Afterthe initial success of the six-months ernergency economic progftrnme, funded lvith the help of the
IMF Post-Conflict Emergency fusisance Poliry, two World Bank loans and additional assistance from the
EU, EBRD and bilateral donors (October 1997-March 1998), the country rvas again plunged into crisis and
its currerfi growth rate is more or less nil.
Industrial production is very low, and the country owes its survival to transfers of capital from the
diaspora (some US$ 400 million per annum), the parallel economy and intemational aid8.
The European Union is the principal donor, its aid to Albania totalling 709 million ecus in the period
l99l-98. including 393 million in comminnent appropriations in technical aid under the PTLARE prograrnme
and cross-border cooperation and 105 million in macro-financial aid to support the country's balance of
paymentse, trirthper capita aid higher than in other Easem countriesro. The rest of the funds provided by the
Union 
- 
approximately 2l I million ecus 
- 
are used for humanitarian ai{ food deliveries (EAGGF) and loans
guararteed by the EIB. In the 1997 crisis, for example, the EU gave Albania subsantial support through a
number of channels: ECHO (1.85 million ecus for drinking water and 6.5 to help refugees and displaced
persons in Kosovo), the PHARE programme (14.5 million ecus in special aid and 14 million in budget
support), the EU food safetyprogramme (10 million).
' DA: International Development Association.t Le Monde,1999 edition, p.45.
n European Parliament, Session document. 27 Jantnry 1999, A4-0041/99: Report on the proposal for a Council
decision on the allocation of macro-economic aid to Albania COM(98)0507-C4-0590198-98/0273(CNS),
Committee on Exlernal Economic Relations: Rapporteur Leonie G.L. van Bladel.
r0 Unofficial figures: the European Union has been assisting Albania through the PHARE programme since
l99l and the Cross Border prograrnme since 1994. The strategic objectives of EU action are to reorganise and
strcngthen the public authorities in Altania, to reorganise the country's social and economic poliry, and to
revitalise the private sector. Between l99l and 1998, the EU provided Albania with financial assistance
amounting to more than 703.4 million ecus under the following headings: PHARE prograrnme. 497.9 million
ecus; EAGGF, 120 million ecus; ECHO, 26.6 million ecus; EIB, 46 million ecus; other, 12.9 million ecus.
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The bountry's extemal debt situation continues to worsenrr.
In such circumstances, financial assistance from the intemational community takes on crucial importance
and reliance on outside firnding is one of the worst problems besetting the Albanian economy. This explains
the EU Council decision to grant macro-economic aid in ttre form of a long-term loan and 20 million ecus
Oringng EU aid up to €34.5 million in 1998) to support the balance of payrnurtsr2.
..Albania still has to solve the problem of its debt to Russi4 Chin4 former Yugoslavi4 the Czech
Republic, the Slovak Republic and Romania. Despite the aid granted by the EU and the international
community, the sAbilisatioq rehabilitation and democratisation of the counfiy are still proceeding at an
uneven and inadequate pace. Current growth is around zero. Any signs of growttr and development in the
Albanian economy are now atrected by the conflict in Kosovo. Foreign investors are put offby the political
instability ofthe region. According to the Financial Timest3 trade is already sutrenng. However, the Kosovo
crisis could have some 'god effecs" for Albania if NATO and the other organisations involved undertake
proJects that will help to improve things for the civilian population (road network, drinking water, etc.).
rr The size of the exlernal deficit determines access to financial support from the IMF.
'' European Parliament, Session document, 27 lanulary 1999, A44041/99; Report on the proposal for a Council
decision on the allocation of macro-economic aid to Albania COM(98)0507-C44590198-98/0273(CNS),
Committee on External Economic Relations; Rapporteur Leonie G.L. van Bladel.
" Con""rn over stability of Albania by Stefan Wagstyl, Financial Times ,14 April 1999.
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M ocro-econ omic b u dg a in dicator s
(million lehe)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 I 998
Total budset deficit 10.905 17.202 16.509 20.054 3 I .718 4t.676 62.829
lnternal financing 10.837 11.624 15.817 15.381 28.524 37.712 30.406
External financing 150 5.578 692 4.673 3.194 3.964 32.423
% of GDP 21.50 t3.7% 9.0% 8.7% tt.3yo 12.2%o 133%
Total EU aid 1991-98
(million ecus)
Type of aid l99l 1992 1993 1994 I 995 1996 1997 1998 Total
1991-98
Total PHARE
prograrnme
10.0 I10.0 75.0 49.0 88.0 53.0 70.4 42.5 497.9
EAGGF 120.0 120.0
ECHO 2.0 0.5 t.7 1.2 1.7 t6.3 3.4 26.6
Food security
DG VIII
10.5 10.5
Other actions 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.4 2.4
EIB loans 34.0 12.0 46.0
Total EU aid 10.0 232.3 76.1 51.8 123.6 66.7 97.2 45.9 703.4
Source: EU Commission
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Total PHARE oid 1991-98
(million ecus)ta
'o European Parliament, Session document, 27 lanuary 1999, A4-0041/99: Report on the proposal for a Council
decision on the allocation of macro-economic aid to Albania COM(98)0507-C4-0590/98-98/0273(CNS).
Committee on Exlernal Economic Relations; Rapporteur Leonie G.L. van Bladel.
Type of aid l99l 1992 1993 t994 I 995 1996 1997 I998 Total
l99l-98
Total
t99l-99
PHARE
national prograrnmes
. Agriculture
o Infrastructure
. Private sector
development
. Health
. Water and
environment
. Education
. Local community
development
. Public
administration
reform
. Harmonisation of
legislation
o Coordination of aid
. Financial and audit
sector
15.0
4.4
2.8
1.2
t.6
10.0
7.0
6.0
3.3
2.5
1.2
5.0
3.0
3.0
7.0
2.4
0.8
0.3
0.5
18.4
2.0
4.2
8.5
1.9
1.7
t7 .0
1.5
2.5
8.6
1.7
6.0
7.0
1.6
2.5
5.0
6.3
0.5
6.3
8.0
2.5
0.7
3.0
8.9
I I
44.0
57.8
14.8
13.0
14.0
16.0
16.5
29.3
0.3
3.3
0.5
50.0
65.0
14.8
13.0
27.2
17.6
23.7
36.6
0.3
3.3
0.5
Total PFIARE national
prografirmes
25.0 30.0 22.0 35.0 33.0 34.0 30.5 209.s 252.0
PFIARE
cross-border
Drosrammes
20.0 18.0 20.0 20.0 12.0 90.0 110.0
OSCE
election support
1.5 1.5 1.5
Balance of payments
support
35.0 35.0 35.0 105.0 105.0
Special budgetary
assistance
14.9 t4.9 t4.9
PHARE
humanitarian aid
50.0 10.0 7.0 77.0 77.0
Total PHARE 10.0 I10.0 75.0 49.0 88.0 53.0 70.4 42.5 497.9 560.4
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Aid to Albania
(unofficial sources)
EUROPEAN UNION:
o (1991-1998) more than 709 million ecus
r in 1998 alone 24.5 million ecus: 14.5 in special assistance under the PHARE
progranrme and l0 under the Community food security programme.
o (1998-99) 105 millionecusunderthePHAREprogranrme +32.5 underthe
cross-border programme (Italy and Greece)
Total: 870.5 million ecus.
WORLD BANK:
. since 1993 466.6 million $ +
o estd. 1999-2001 145 million $ country assistance programme +
22 million $ Rehabilitation credit +
5 million $ Economic recovery technical assistance project+
l0 million $ Private industry recovery project +
12 million S Coastal conservation
28 million $ Health care system
Total: 688.6 million $
IMF:
since May 1997 47 million $ Extended Structural Adjustrnent Facility
EBRD:
o 3.5 million S Albania Euromerchant Fund
. l0 million $ SME recovery credit line (Banca Italo-Albanese and Tirana Bank)
. already invested 74.3 million ecus (approx.)
r Total: 87.8
a
UNDP: 15 million $
BILATERAL AID:
1992-t997 490 million $: EU 136 million $; Germany 107 million $;
Itdy 82 million $; Japan 58 million $; Swizerland 46 million $;
Kuwait 23 million $
o ITALY: 1998 215 billion Lire +
1998-2000 210 billion Lire (30 billion in grants and another 180 billion in the form
of a loan with special conditions) +
50 billion Lire Defence cooperation
20 billion Lire Direct aid to the population
495 billion Lire = approximately 250 million euros
Totalrt: approximately 2250 million euros
It This does not include aid of 62 million euros, which the EU has promised to grant Albania as a couritry
receiving refugees, in addition to the 150 million euros for the refugees themselves (1999).
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Population (million) 3 249 754 (June 1995 estd; last
census 1989: 3 182 000)
Ased 15-64 (%) 42.1
Crude Birth Rate (CBR)%o 22.2
Annual growth ( I 990-95) 0.23%
Densiw (oop.,'lcm') I15.0
Total fertility rate (TFR 1990-95) 2.7
Infant mortality %o 22.5
4%o hipher in ntral areas
Life expectancv fuear) 7ll
Urban population (1995) % 58
Number of emisrants 1990-95 300-350 000
Number of Kosovar refugees in Albaniat8 371 000
S o c i o-cu lt u r ul i n dicat o r sl e
Human development (H DI) 0.655
Number of doctors (%o pop,) t.4t 099s)
Hieher edncation ok 9.6 fi993)
Internet address (%o pop.) 0.32
Labour forcdc'
Total fuillion) 2
Female (o/o of labour force) 4l
Children aged l0-14 (o% of age group) I
Unemploymentrate (%o) l4 (Oct.97) fficially, but likely to
be as hish as 28o%
Healthzl
Public expenditure on health (% of GDP
1990-95)
2.7
Statistical data16
r6 http://www.undp.org/popin/regionaVeurope/index.htm Regional Population Information Europe, National
Report submitted by the Government of Albania- CES/PAU/1998/1.1, 9 November 1998, Regional Population
Meeting, Budapest, 7-9 December 1998.
r7 International Monetary Fund, Staffcountry Report No 98/62, August 1998.
It Figures at29l}1tl999. Source LJNHCR. http://www.unhcr.ch./news/media/kosovo.htm.
re World Development Report 1998/99, p.194.
20 http ://wurr.stratfor.com/kosovo/albania.htm?section=2.
2r World Development Report 1998199, p.202.
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APPENDIX [T'
The situation of the refugees in Kosovo
Kosovo
o population: I 956 196
. Albanians in Kosovo: I 800 000
o Number of people forced to leave their homes in the past year: 960 000
. Number of refugees lvho have left Kosovo since the outbreak of war: 700 000
K os ov o disp a ce ment stotistics :
Albania: 371 000
FYROM: 154 400
Republic of Montenegro: 62 800
Bosnia and Herzegovina: 15 000
Total : 603 200
Iceland
Netherlands l0ll
" Source: LINHCR" 28 April 1999. http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm.
23 of whom 88 bilaterallv without UNHCMOM involvement.
2a of whom I 980 bilateially without UNHCMOM involvement.
2s of whom 2 068 bilaterally without UNHCR/IOM involvement.
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2310y1997
2410U1997
26l0Ut9e7
27/01/1997
3v0U1997
41021t997
sl02/1997
610211997
tU02lt997
t2/02/1997
15102/1997
t6/0211997
1910211997
201021t997
24/021t997
APPENDIX IV
Chronologv : Albania I 997-99
1997
Januury
The People's Assembly passed a law banning pyramid finance schemes and imposing
penalties of up to 20 years in prison for operators. Most of the schemes had collapsed
by 23 January.
Violent clashes in Lushnja" in the south, between 5 000 demonstrators and riot police.
Angry crorvds set fire to buildings in towns across southern Albania as the protests
mounted. Thousands of demonstrators marched through Tirana lvhere they clashed with
police. The People's Assembly decided to grant special powers to the President to
restore lalv and order. They included the use oftroops to unblock roads and to guard
government buildings.
Armed troops took up positions around the central bank and state television
headquarters in Tirana.
The cabinet met and approved a law aimed at establishing procedures for redistributing
to more than 200 000 savers the US$ 300 million confiscated from the Xhaferri and
Populli schemes.
February
The Gjallica, another large pyramid finance scheme, collapsed. The government started
paying out the frozen assets of fivo of the country's collapsed pyramid finance schemes,
Populli and Xhaferri.
Violent unrest erupted in Vlore. Vefa Holdings and three other companies 
- 
Kamberi,
Canaj and Silva 
- 
announced that they had formed a Financial Union in order to boost
confidence among their depositors and as a first step towards being awarded a banking
licence.
Up to 30 000 protesters occupied Vlore City centre. The police had to intervene.
The Republican ParW (3 seats in the People's Assembly) announced its withdra\,val
from the coalition led by the Democratic Party and demanded the resignation of the
government.
The Government called off a move by Prime Minister Alexander Meksi to declare a
state of emergency in More.
President Sali Berisha delivered a speech to the members of the ruling Democratic Party
of Albania in which he admitted that his government had made mistakes.
Anti-government demonstrations spread north from Vlore to the town of Fier.
Leni Fisher. President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
appealed to the political leaders in Albania to show responsibility in handling the crisis
following the collapse of the pyramid investment schemes26.
The Albanian Prime Minister, Mr Meksi, resigned,
The European Council called on the Albanian authorities to continue to carry through
political and economic measures r,vith determination and to respect the basic principles
of democracy. The Council welcomed the Commission's suggestions on assistance for
Albania through the PFIARE programme".
26 Strasbourg, Ref. 102(97), http://www.coe.fr.cpl97ll02a%o2897oh29.htm.
" EU Bulletin ll2-1997 Mediterranean and Middle East (3124).
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2810211997 New disorders in Vlore, three more people were reported killed and at least l0 were
lvounded in shootings in the city.
v03/1997
2/03/1997
3/0311997
4/0311997
s/03/19e7
6/03/1997
7103/t997
9/03/1997
t010311997
tt/031t997
121031t997
March
President Berisha ordered the resignation of the government headed by Prime Minister
Alexander Meksi. This constituted Berisha's first major concession to his opponents.
The People's Assembly declared a national state of emergency.
Violence escalated in More as rebels managed to overrun the SHIK (the National
lnformation Service) headquarters.
A state of emergency was declared in the south of Albania.
The authorities moved to enforce the state of emergency. A national curfew (from 07.00
to 08.00) was imposed and tanks were deployed in srategic areas. Violence continued
in the south of the country: Vlore, Sarande, Gjirokaster and Delvine. The People's
Assembly re-elected Berisha (113 in favour, I against, 4 abstentions) as President for a
second five-year term in defiance of the rebel demands for his resignation.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called for a government of
national consensus in Albania and supported the call for rapid, concerted and effective
action by the international community to help Albania in the current situation28.
The Army Chief of Stafi General Sheme Kosova. was dismissed and replaced by
Major General Adem Copani, Berisha's personal military adviser.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe sent a mission to Tirana to try to
help restore peace and dialogue between the Albanian Government and the opposition.
The former Austrian Chancellor, Franz Vranitzky, was appointed OSCE special envoy
to Albania.
President Berisha agreed to suspend military activity against the rebels in the south for
a tlvo-day period, starting at 06.00 on 7 March. The offer was largely ignored by the
rebels.
The EU declared its readiness to support the OSCE in this endeavour to achieve
peaceful reconciliation in Albania. It rvelcomed the steps taken by the Council of
Europe and asked the OSCE and the Council of Europe to work together to strengthen
democracy in Albania2e.
President Berisha agreed to form a broad-based govemment of national reconciliation 
-
which would include Socialist Party members 
- 
and to hold general elections by June
1997. He also extended his previous amnesty offer to the rebels by a week. The
agreements lvere welcomed by the opposition, who nevertheless conceded that they had
little influence over the rebels in the south. The agreement between Berisha and the
opposition was brokered by diplomats from Italy, Greece, the EU- the Council of
Europe and the OSCE.
A group of rebel leaders from More held talks with the Italian Ambassador to Albania,
Paolo Foresti, aboard an ltalian warship in the Adriatic. After the talks- the ltalians
issued a statement saying that the rebels would consider ending the uprising in return
for the deal reached between Berisha and the opposition.
President Berisha appointed Bashkim Fino, a member of the opposition Socialist Part-v
of Albania and former mayor of Gjirokaster, as the country's nelv Prime Minister.
Rebels in Vlore announced the formation for the first time of a formal body, the
National Committee for Public Salvation.
Weapons were being looted from dumps in Mjekes, near Elbasan, 55 lffN from Tirana.
The security situation in Tirana deteriorated sharply.
2* Strasbourg, Ref. I 14(97), http://www.coe.fr.cp/97lll4a%o2891%o29.htm.
" EU Bulletin3-1997 Common Foreign and Security Poliry (2/13).
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ln one of his first statements Fino called for talks with the rebels and appealed for
outside military assistance to restore order in Albania.
Emergency meeting of ambassadors from NATO countries in Brussels.
Berisha swore in a new government of "national reconciliation".
13103/1997 The WEU Assembll,'5 Standing Committee unanimously adopted Recommendation
609 on the situation in Albania. [t recommended that the Council monitor very closely
the development of the situation in Albania, instruct the WEU Satellite Centre in
Torrej6n to provide ongoing assessments and ask the Planning Cell to draw up
contingency plans for possible operations in Albania3o.
Albanian President Berisha with the support of his country's political classes, called
for international military intervention to restore constitutional order in the country and
protect its integritl'.
1410311997 The WEU Council issued a declaration on Albania calling on the parties to refrain from
the use of force and to establish a dialogue so that the democratic process could resume
its course.
15-16103/1997 EU foreign ministers' meeting in the Netherlands: the Albanian crisis was on the agenda
but no solution rvas adopted.
1510311997 President Berisha officially pardoned Fatos Nano, Socialist Party Chairman and Prime
Minister in l99l- imprisoned in April 1994 for misappropriation of state funds and
other offences.
19/0311997 The government managed to restore order in Tirana by mobilising hundreds of armed
vigilantes.
The ltalian cabinet met in an emergency session to discuss the refugee crisis, by which
time some l0 000 Albanian refugees had entered the country.
The Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
called for a tripartite task force (Council of Europe, European Union, OSCE) to give
immediate intemational support to the new coalition government in Albania3r.
2010311997 The Albanian authorities reopened Tirana airport to prove that order had been restored
in the capital.
At its meeting, the OSCE Permanent Council agreed a decision expressing support for
Dr Vranitzky's work and declaring the Organisation's readiness, in coordination with
other international institutions and organisations, to assist Albania in democratisation
and in preparing and monitoring the elections, and to explore the possibility of
monitoring the surrender of weapons.
2410311997 The EU Council expressed its support for the OSCE's efforts and decided that the EU
would cooperate "within the coordinating framework of the OSCE".
The EU General Affairs Council decided to send an "Advisory Mission" and start a
programme of humanitarian aid.
2510311997 EU foreign ministers met in Rome to mark the 40th anniversary of the signrng of the
Treaty of Rome. Fino and ministers travelled to Rome to make a collective appeal to the
meeting for the creation of a multinational force for Albania. Divisions within the EU
over the issue meant that no decision was taken at the meeting.
27103197 By Decision No. 160, the OSCE Permanent Council decided to establish "an OSCE
presence" in Albania. It was also decided that the OSCE would "provide the coordinat-
ing framework within which other intemational organisations can play their part in their
respective areas of competence, in support of a coherent intemational strategy and in
facilitating improvements in the protection of human rights and basic elements of civil
society".
30 See Recommendation 609 on the situation in Albania A/WEU/ SC (97) PV l.
3r Report by Ren6 Van Der Linden EPP, Netherlands. htp://www.coe.ft.cp/97ll02ao/A897Yo29.htm.
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281031t997
2910311997
l/0411997
2/0411997
4/04t1997
4-5t04/1997
710411997
810311997
9/0411997
10t04n997
An accident occurred at sea between an Italian patrol boat the *Sibilla" and an
Albanian vessel near Brindisi, in which some 80 Albanians died.
The IIN Security Council authorised the intervention of a temporary multinational
force in Albania. Its task was to secure the completion of the humanitarian operation32.
This force was deployed under ltalian command within the framework of Operation
Alba, in compliance r,vith Article VII of the United Nations Charter, for a period of
three months.
The UN Security Council voted in favour of the OSCE proposal to allow individual
states to help the Albanian Government restore order33.
April
Bashkim Fino travelled to the rebel-held south for the first time since the insurgents had
seized the region.
The Socialist Party of Albania leadership voted unanimously to re-enter the People's
Assembly (the l0 Socialist Party members had boycotted the Assembly since disputed
parliamentary elections in May and June 1996).
Bashkim Fino met Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, in Gjirokaster. The talks
centred on Italian efforts to organise a multinational force to back the humanitarian
operation in Albania.
Fino held talks in Athens with Greek Prime Minister, Kostas Simitis, concerning
Greece's participation in the multinational force.
Events in Albania also had a major impact on domestic politics in Italy. The Olive Tree
governing coalition won the backing of the main opposition parties for its proposal to
send an ltalian-led force to Albania. But the Communist Refoundation refused to back
the government.
First meeting of the Steering Commrttee of countries that decided to participate in the
MPF (Multinational Protection Force).
A Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly delegation visited Albania on a fact-
finding mission on 4 and 5 April 1997 - to establish contact with the new coalition
govemment and representatives of all political parties. The visit lvas a direct follow-up
to Assembly Recommendation l316 (97), adopted unanimously on l9 March lgg73a..
The Italian Senate endorsed the deployment of Italian troops by 154 votes to I19, with
2 abstentions.
A WEU Planning Cell evaluation mission visited Albania.
The People's Assembly voted to end press restrictions which had been imposed in early
March as part of a lvider state of emergency.
The WEU Council decided to task the Politico-Military Group to undertake to
reorganise the Albanian police, with the dispatch of a 20-strong detachment3s.
" Terre Llagazine No.93. 1998, p.40
33 Compo.ilion ofthe Nlultinational hotection Force for Albania
Co,ntry
Italy
France
Turkey
Number oftroops
2500
I 000
r20
65
5915
'o Ref. I 80197), http://wurv .coe.fr.cpl97 I l80ao/A897%o29.htm.
35 See Written Question 317 ptrtto the Council by Mrs Squarcialupi and Mr Bratina on I I July 1997.
Greece
Spain
Romania
Austria
Denmark
Total
700
680
450
400
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1U04lr9e7
t3l04lte97
1510411997
171041t997
191041t997
20/041t997
221041t997
23-2510411997
24t04n997
26104119e7
2/0511997
4105n997
710511997
9tlsfi997
The PMG r,vas asked to study the experience acquired by WEU during the mission in
Mostar, in order to consider horv a multinational advisory mission to Albania might be
organised.36
Advance units of the force began securing Tirana.
The National Council of the ruling Democratic Party of Albania (Democratic Part-v)
met and backed Berisha's leadership of the parr-v-.
The exiled pretender to the Albanian throne- Leka Zogu- son of Krng Zog rvho had
reigned from 1929 to 1939. retumed to Albania and called for a referendum on the
restoration of the monarchy.
More than I 000 troops (Italian, French and Spanish) arrived in Durres.
A small force of Italian troops entered Vlore and held talks with rebel leaders. Ekeren
Osmani, the self-st-vled defence commander of the rebel Committee of Public Salvation
assured the Italian troops of his full support.
Vranitzky (head of the OSCE delegation) said that the leaders of the main political
parties had agreed on 29 June as the date for the early parliamentary elections, but had
not reached a consensus on the nature ofthe poll.
The National Reconciliation Government voted to dismiss General Agim Shehu as
Deputy Interior Minister and Chief of the country's police force.
President Berisha rejected the government's decision and said that General Agim Shehu
would remain in his post.
The Committee of Heads of Political Departments of the EU discussed the situation in
Albania and expressed approval for WEU's decision to send a fact-finding mission to
Albania.
WEU fact-finding mission. including representatives of the OSCE and the Council of
Europe, lvithin the framelvork of the proposed programme of assistance to the Albanian
police.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe agreed unanimously that it
should take a central role in preparing and monitoring the Albanian parliamentary
elections, in liaison rvith the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of
the OSCE37.
14 dissident members of the Democratic Party announced that they had established a
nelv political parfy, the Movement for Democracy.
May
The Council of WEU decided to set up a Multinational Advisory Police Element
(MAPE) for Albania3'. MAPE's tasks rvere: to respond to needs for advice on training
(particularly in the fields of organisation, border monitoring, logistics and
communication) and support expressed by the Albanian authorities and to advise the
Albanian police on their responsibilities during the elections.
An Albanian cargo vessel carrying 1229 Albanians rvas allowed to enter the Italian
port of Bari after rejecting a request made by the Italian navy to return to Albanian
rvaters.
During talks in Tirana betr,veen OSCE Special Envoy Vranitzky and Albanian Prime
Minister Fino, the latter asked for MAPE to be deployed in connection rvith the
elections planned for June.
Albania's main political parties, including President Berisha's Democratic Party and
Fino's Socialist Parby signed a contract which committed them to holding fresh
36 l,ltEtl police forces - reply to the annual report oJ'the Council, report submitted on behalf of the Defence
Committee by Mr Giannastasio. Rapporteur; Doc. 1609, 13 May 1998, p.18.
" Pref .252197), http://rww .coe.fr.cpl97 1252aYo2897%o29.hr m.38See Written Question 347 put to the Council by Mrs Squarcialupi and Mr Bratina on I I July 1997.
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elections before the end of June. The contract rvas brokered by former Austrian
Chancellor Franz Vranitzky.
The People's Assembly passed legislation regulating the operation of pyramid
invesffnent schemes.
The WEU Council reached agreement with the Albanian Government that the police
element's mandate lvould not extend beyond 12 August3e.
The Democratic Party placed its orvn new electoral lalv before the People's Assembly.
Fino and key members of his cabinet were in Washington for talks rvith US Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright.
A MAPE advance element was deployed in Tirana. The rest of the mission was to
follow after the signature, on 24 June, of a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Albanian authorities.
Vranitzky announced that he had arranged a compromise and elections would take place
on 29 June.
The People's Assembly approved the new electoral larv, promulgated by President
Berisha later in the day.
The Socialist Party and its allies indicated that they would boycott the election unless
Berisha and the Democratic Party agreed to a number of demands. including the
appointrnent of a Central Electoral Commission by the Govemment of National
Reconciliation, the guaranteed presence of international obsenrers during the election
and the replacement of the current chief of the country's security apparatus. the
National Information Service (SHIK).
Vranitzky announced that all the main political parties had agreed to contest the 29 June
election.
The President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Leni Fisher.
welcomed the agreement reached between the Albanian political parties on the election
la#'.
Announcement of the composition of a l7-member central election committee.
International conference on Albania convened in Rome.
June
Launch of European Commission Customs Assistance Mission (ECCAM)1|
210611997 The EU Council adopted a common position on Albania, with a view to promoting
democracy and restoring political stability and internal security in the country.
4/0611997 A series of bombs exploded in the capital, Tirana, and an assassination attempt against
President Sali Berisha was reported.
12106/1997 The Vienna-based OSCE stated in a public report that32 out of 79 articles in Albania's
olvn election law rvere violated during the ballot and the pre-election period.
16-1710611997 T\e European Council reaffirmed the determination of the Union, in accordance lvith
the common position adopted on 2 June and its regional approach, to help Albania to
return to political and economic stability. to establish internal security and to promote
the democratic process. The Council of the European Union fully supported the
coordinating efforts of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office,
Mr Franz Vranizky, and the role of the MPF.
1910611997 The UN Security Council voted to extend the force's mandate by 45 days to mid-
August. The force's initial 3-month mandate would have expired on 28 June.
3e ibid.
a0 nef. : t o 1 s7 ), http : //wwrv . coe.fr . cp I 97 I 3 I 6 ao/o2897 o/A9. ht m.
" RD 3199,p.66.
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Leading figures for the two main political parties 
- 
the Democratic and Socialist Parties
- 
met in Rome to sign a "pact for the future" in which they agreed to campaign
peacefully and respect the results of the elections.
A memorandum of understanding was signed between WEU and the Albanian
authorities. The MAPE mission was completeda2.
First round of voting in elections to the l55-member People's Assembly; a non-binding
referendum was also held on the question of the Albanian monarchy.
Several acts of violence occurred, the most serious near Fier, where a Socialis Party
supporter shot dead an election official.
Socialist Party Chairman Fatos Nano claimed that his party had won 60 of the I 15
directly elected seats and 24 of the 40 seats allocated on the basis of proportional
representation.
President Berisha announced on national television that he would accept the election
results and "respect all the declarations (he) (had) made", an apparent allusion to an
earlier pledge to resign from the presidency if the Democratic Party was defeated.
July
Allegation of electoral malpractice prompted the monarchists to organise a protest rally
in Tirana.
Second round ofvoting.
An OSCE report described the conduct of the election as "acceptable" and estimated
tumout ataroundT3%o.
Re-runs lvere held in two constituencies.
The Central Electoral Commission announced the referendum results: 66.74%o had
voted in favour of the Republic and 33.26Yo in favour of the monarchy. A pro-
monarchy Legality Movement said that the results were invalid because of electoral
inegularity.
The Central Electoral Commission announced the official results43.
The Italian Foreign Minister, Lamberto Dini, wrote to NATO Secretary-General Javier
Solan4 OSCE representative Franz Vranitzky, and German Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel (in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of WEII) to alert thern to question of
international involvement in Albania following the withdrawal of MAPE.
ln a statement to the opening session of the new People's Assembly, Berisha announced
his resignation as President.
a2 http :/hvww.weu.int/fralempc/situation.htm
o' Results of general elections
Party
Socialist Party
Demorratic Party
Social DEmocratic Party of Albania (PSDS)
Union for human rights PMDN)
Party ofthe Democratic alliance of Albania (AD)
National Front Party
[.egality Movemort
Albanian Republican Party
Party ofNational Unitv
Albanian Agrarian party (AP)
Independents
Total
Seats
I01
29
8
4
1
3
,,
I
I
I
3
155
3l
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The WEU Council decided to extend MAPE's mandate for two months, from 12
August to 12 October 1997, and appointed the French Colonel Frederic Denis Head of
Mission+.
The People's Assembly elected Rexhep Mejdani. Secretary-General of the Socialist
Party, as the new President.
The Socialist Party proposed Nano as Prime Minister and Mejdani formally invited him
to take office.
The new Assembly approved a law which lifted the state of emergency imposed in
March.
A new cabinet. headed by Nano and composed of members of the Socialist Parry, the
Democratic Alliance, the Social Democratic Party, the Agrarian Party and the Union
for Human Rights was sworn in the presence of Mejdani.
Nano submifted the cabinet and his government's programme to the People's Assembly.
The Assembly approved both by 116 votes to 0, lvith 2 abstentions. The session rvas
boycotted by Democratic Party members.
An intemational conference on Albania opened in Rome. Delegates to the conference 
-
attended by Prime Minister Nano and representatives from OSCE member states and
other countries 
- 
confirmed international support for Albanian economic and political
reconstruction in the aftermath of the rebellion. Adoption of the "elements for an
international agenda".
August
Interior Minister Neritan Ceka announced that he would rid Albania's roads of gangs
and robbers within 60 days.
Sabit Brokaj, the Albanian Defence Minister- rvarned that high-ranking officers who
had "violated the constitution" by "accepting political orders" should resign voluntarily
or they would face trial.
The National Council of the Democratic Party approved the dismissal of a number of
high-ranking officials.
The visiting Greek Foreign Minister- Theodoros Pangalos- signed an agreement lvith his
counterpart, Paskal Milo, guaranteeing that Albanian migrant workers in Greece would
receive temporary work permits.
Assistance and cooperation protocol for the armed forces signed between the Hellenic
Ministry of National Defence and the Albanian Ministry of Defence.
The last members of the multinational force left Albania. A small number of Greek and
Italian officers remained in the country in order to help reorganise the Albanian army
and police, operating on the basis of bilateral treaties.
The government announced that it had sent interior ministry troops to the southern
towns of Vlore, Gjirokaster, Sarande and Telepene to restore order.
Formal end of "Operation AIba", ttre Italian-led UN protection force created in April.
The government announced that it had retaken control of the port of More.
President Rexhep Mejdani dismissed Major-General Adem Copani as Army Chief of
Staff.
Colonel Aleks Andoni replaced Copani as Army Chief of Staff.
Mejdani appointed Fatos Klosi as head ofthe National Information Service (SHIK).
The Constitutional Court declared the results of the 29 June non-binding referendum
valid.
Defence Minister Brokaj signed an agreement with his Italian counterpart Beniamino
Andreatta, during a visit in Rome. The agreement provided for Italian assistance in
rebuilding and revitalising the Albanian armed forces.
44 WEU police force.t - repty to the annual report of the Council, report submitted on behalf of the Defence
Committee by Mr Giannastasio, Rapporteur; Assembly Document 1609, 13 May 1998.
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September
Nerv press law.
The Albanian Government reached an agreement in principle with IMF officials on an
economic stabilisation programme.
Albanian Prime Minister. Fatos Nano, expressed his gratitude for WEU assistance in
police matters to the Permanent Council. He also stressed the resolve of his government
to carry out the restructuring and modemisation of the Albanian police force according
to the highest possible standardsas.
The Council agreed to extend MAPE's mandate for six months to 12 April 1998, rvith
the option of further extensions thereaftertr. MAPE strength increased.
The Italian and Albanian Ministers of the Interior signed a memorandum of
understanding (Bilaterale Interni) establishing close police collaboration on a project
for training. assistance and advice to the Albanian policetT.
Azem Hajdai. a legislator from the opposition Democratic Party, was shot and
wounded inside the People's Assembly by Gafur Mazreku, an MP from the ruling
Socialist Party. Demonstrations in Tirana followed this incident.
The Democratic Party's National Council decided that the parfy r,vould boycott the
Assembly session "for an unlimited time" in protest at the shooting of Hajdari.
The Supreme Court overturned the convictions of all 32 former communist officials
who had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment for crimes against humanity.
End of the six-week amnesty for people in possession of weapons.
October
The WEU Secretary-General visited Albania.
The government signed a six-month agreement with the IMF.
Kostas Simitis, the Prime Minister of Greece, visited Albania for talks with Fatos Nano
about a Greek loan of US$ 72 million. Opening of the Administrative Centre for the
Coordination of Assistance and Public Participation (ACCAPP) in Tirana. Its mission
was to coordinate assistance and public participation in the drafting of a constitution for
the Republic of Albania.
Ministerial conference on Albania in Rome, under Italian chairmanshipa8.
tnternational donors' conference on Albania in Brussels.
National conference of the Democratic Party. Former President of Albania Sali Berisha
was re-elected as party-leader by 791votes to I15.
Signature of the Memorandum of Understanding for the MAPE mission within the
framework of an operation to rebuild the Albanian police force.
The main international fund lenders met in Brussels and granted an emergency aid
package worth dozens of millions of dollars (to be spent on health, education and food),
plus financial support of US$ 300 million to help set up structural reforms
(privatisations, especially in the banking sector) on condition that strict budgetary
austerity was implemented and comrption was stamped out.
as See reply to Written Question 341 pttto the Council by Mrs Squarcialupi and Mr Bratina on I I June 1997.
o6 ibid.
o7 RID 3199, p.66
a6 Attended by representatives of the Austrian, Belgian, Danish, Finnish, German, Greek, Irish, Japanese,
Lurembourg, Netherlands, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Slovenian, Spanish, Swedish, Swiss,
Turkish, United Kingdom and United States Governments. International organisations included the EU,
European Commission, OSCE, Council of Europe, WEU, NATO. UN and IMF, IFAD. World Bank, EBRD,
EIB,ICRC.
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November
The IMF approved a credit for the Albanian equivalent of SDR 8.825 million in
support of the government's economic progmrnme for 1997-98.
The People's Assembly approved without amendment a bill establishing an Assembly
commission to investigate the armed rebellion which had beset Albania earlier in the
year. President Mejdani sent the bill back for reconsideration.
The Constitutional Court ruled that a key article in a piece of legislation designed to
regulate the operation of pyramid finance schemes was unconstitutional because it
violated the principle of the separation of powers.
The People's Assembly amended the constitution to allow the government to audit and
administer private companies if their activities "endangered or harmed the economic
interests of citizens".
Deadline of residency permits for some 5 000 Albanian migrants in [taly.
December
Five judges of the Constitutional Court filed a charge of slander against Skender
Gjinushi, Speaker of the People's Assembly.
Prime Minister Nano signed a US$ 250 million agreement in London to develop
Albania's largest onshore oilfield and build a pipeline between Vlore and Durres.
Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini went to Albania to discuss the repatriation
process. He also announced an ltalian aid package to Albania worth some L 317
billion.
1998
January
In Skopje, Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano signed 8 bilateral agreements with
FYROM, in order to avoid violence in Kosovo spreading into the country.
February
The commission established by the People's Assembly in October 1997 to investigate
the armed rebellion, which had beset Albania earlier in the year 1997, published its
findings.
The opposition Democratic Party rejected the findings of the commission's report and
described the unrest as a "communistJed armed rebellion" aimed at destroying
democracy.
A gang of rioters, comprising civiliaas and local police force, attacked Shkoder, a
northern Albanian town: 100 masked gang members and policemen invaded the city,
attacked the police station and freed 60 prisoners. After a day of fighting, special police
units from Tirana regained control and maintained order.
Government troops managed to regain control of the town.
March
310311998 New cooperation agreement between the Italian and Albanian Governments to continue
the joint forces mission until the territorial and coastal defence arrangements were in
placeae.
o'RID 3199,page66.
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The Secretary-General of WEU, Jose Cutileiro, expressed WEU's concern over the
situation in Kosovo.
The opposition Democratic Party ended its five-month boycott of the People's
Assembly. The Albanian news agency ATA reported that the Democratic Party had
ended the boycott on 28 February as a sign of support for etlrnic Albanians in the Serb
province of Kosovo.
Memorandum of Understanding on consultation and assistance for the reorganisation of
the Albanian tax administration, accompanied by a joint declaration by Italy, Albania
and the European Commission within the framework of the EU memorandum on
customs assistance "ECCAM-Albania" signed on l0 November 1997 (exlended 15
January 1999).
A closed session of the People's Assembly voted to dismiss Rustem Gjata from his post
as Chairman of the Constitutional Court, on the charge of cooperation with internal
security organs during the communist era.
Defence agreement between Albania and FYROM.
The Foreign Ministers of the countries of south-eastern Europe - Bulgaria, FYROM,
Greece, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey - discussed the situation in Kosovo with the
Albanian Prime Minister at a meeting in Bonn.
April
The WEU Permanent Council agreed to extend MAPE's mandate for a year to l2 April
1999, with the option of a mid-term review in October 199850. The Council approved
an increase in MAPE personnel, bringing the strength up from the present 60 or so to
around l00sr.
The People's Assembly voted to legalise the Albanian Communist Party.
Prime Minister Fatos Nano reshuffled his cabinet.
President Rexhep Mejdani refused to sanction the new cabinet.
President Mejdani agreed to only 2 out of 9 ministerial changes.
The People's Assembly signalled its growing alarm over events in Kosovo by appealing
to NATO to deploy troops on its territory to avoid the conflict spilling over.
Prime Minister Nano accused President Mejdani of throwing the country into political
crisis.
Nano withdrew his previous remarks and the President approved two more of the
proposed ministerial changes.
President Mejdani approved two further changes.
President Mejdani approved all the changes in the cabinet.
For the first time Prime Minister Fatos Nano launched a fierce attack on tle Serbian
leadership. His statement was the strongest condemnation yet from Albania of Yugoslav
military actions in Kosovo.
In a letter to the Italian Foreign Minister, Larnberto Dini, on the eve of the Contact
Group's meeting in Rome at the end of April 1998, Nano requested the deployment of
NATO troops along Albania's northern borders to prevent the conflict spilling over into
Albania.
May
The Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU countries met in Rhodes. The ministers
instructed the Permanent Council to discuss other possible areas of cooperation with the
'o Press release, Brussels, 7 April 1998.
'' Press release, Brussels, 7 April 1998. The WEU contribution to the efforts of the international communitv in
Albania is based on close cooperation with the European Union and complementary with the other multilateral
and bilateral initiatives.
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Albanian authorities (broadening MAPE's advisory role: continuing the training and
supply of additional equipment in order to improve the ability of the Albanian police to
monitor and control its borders). The President of the Assembly, Lluis Maria de Puig,
stated in a speech to the WEU Council of Ministers that ''WEU must decide to prepare
for intervention, which will take place only if the situation deteriorates and there is no
possibility of reaching a negotiated political settlement"52.
The IMF approved a 3-year loan for Albania, equivalent to SDR 35.3 million, under the
enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) in support of the government's
economic programme for 1998-2001.
The Council of the European Union declared that in view of the new spiral of violence
in which the Serbian army appeared to be prepared to become involved- the Union had
to shoulder its responsibilities, in particular for taking preventive measures (protection
of the Albanian-Macedonian border). WEU should also undertake investigations and
make recommendations53.
WEU addressed an exclusive request for an ECCAM mission to the Italian Guardia di
Finanzasa.
The WEU Assembly recommended that the Council: (2) ask the Planning Cell to draw
up contingency plans addressing all possible options for an effective WEU presence in
Albania and FYROM which should be able to limit the repercussions of any violent
conflict in Kosovo; (3) propose to the European Council, in application of Article
VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty and Article J.7.1 of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
and on the basis of the Planning Cell's contingency plans, an effective WEU presence in
both FYROM and Albania to help keep up the EU's political and economic pressure;
(4) instruct the Plaruring Cell, in accordance with Chapter MI of the Charter of the
United Nations and Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty, to prepare a set of
options for possible European intervention in Kosovoss.
Albanian police stopped a lorry loaded with 200 kalashnikovs, 400 grenades and 500
crates of ammunition heading towards Kosovo.
Clashes between Albanian separatists and the Serbian police force in the border zone
with Albania.
In answer to Nano's appeal for intervention, NATO announced that it would draw up
contingency plans for the deployment of troops along the Albanian border with Kosovo
in order to prevent the spread of the conflict.
June
Inauguration of the NATO cell/Partnership for Peace in Tirana.
Koco Dado, head of Albania's Association of Businessmen- was kidnapped in Tirana.
Ilir Cano, Tirana's Deputy Policy Chief stated that the kidnapping could have been
related to Dado's fund-raising efforts for ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo.
Albanian customs officials in Durres seized a lorry that had just arrived off the ferry
from Italy and contained a large quantity of weapons destined for Kosovo.
The Alliance for the State (ASH) coalition, which included the Socialist Party, won 5
out of 7 municipal bye-elections and 6 out of 9 communal by-elections.
The Permanent Council of WEU decided that MAPE should give priority to training,
advice and assistance for border police.
t' I4.EU ancl crisis ruanagenrcnt in the Balkanr, report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr
Paumel, Chairman and Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1627 , 9 Novemberl998.53 Session report 
- 
May 1998. p.34.
'o RD 3/99,p.66.tt Recommendation 627 on Europe and the evolving situation in the Balkans, adopted by the Assembly at the
first part of its 44th session, Paris, May 1998.
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July
The People's Assembly adopted the reports of the Assembly commission investigating
the civil unrest of 1997 .
Berisha ordered the Democratic Party to boycott the Assembly in protest at what he
alleged r,vas violence and comrption within the government.
The WEU Council of Ministers tasked the Military Staff to prepare a feasibility study
on possible options for an international police operation in Albania, to be pursued rvith
the consent and cooperation of the Albanian authorities and taking into account the
ongoing reflections within NATO, also in order to avoid duplication of works6.
A LJN report recommended the creation of a disarmament project in the Gramsh region.
A border zone between Kosovo and Albania was rvidened to 5 kms to help Serbian
forces repel Albanian rebels.
The WEU Council of Ministers, having examined the preliminary draft feasibility
study, instructed the Military Staffto complete its studysT.
August
Draft constitution adopted.
Agreement on the programme of cooperation between Italy and Albania for the three-
year period I 998-2000 (input 2 l0 billion on the Italian side).
The Americans decided to evacuate their embassy in Tirana.
The Justice Ministry registered a new party, tle New Labour Party.
Six former high-ranking officials and members of the main opposition party, the
Democratic Party, lvere arrested on charges of crimes against humanity during the civil
unrest that swept through the country n 1997.
A military court in Tirana ruled that the six former officials should remain in custody
pending trial, for which no date was fixed.
Following the arrests, the former Democratic Party leader and former President, Sali
Berisha, rejected the invitation from Nano for talks on a new constitution and instead
organised a demonstration by 3 000 supporters in Tirana.
September
Unrest in Tirana after Azem Hajdari, Democratic Party legislator and Berisha's close
aide was shot dead outside the party's headquarters.
Democratic Party supporters gathered on the streets of the city and eventually
ransacked Nano's office, an action denounced by the government as an attempted coup.
President Rexhep Mejdani called for a return to calm.
The Secretary-General of WEU, Mr Jos6 Cutileiro, condemned the murder of the
Member of Parliament, Mr Azem Hajdari, and his bodyguard, and called on all
Albanian parties and the Albanian population to shorv calm and restraint.
The EU, OSCE and WEU strongly condemned the use of violence in Albania. ln a clear
joint appeal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Mr Schi.issel, the OSCE Chairman-in-
Office, Mr Geremek, and the WEU Chairman-in-Office, Mr Dini, called upon all
political parties to support President Mejdani in his efforts to quell the crisis. The
Government of Albania was urged to ensure the safety of the population and restore
order.
s6 Reply of the Council to Recommendation 627, NWEIJIDG(98)16, Paris 13 October 1998.t' l4tEU and crisis management in the Balkans, report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr
Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur, Assembly Document L627,9 November 199E.
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ln a resolution, the European Parliament firrnly condemned the political violence
against the democratically elected institutions of the Republic of Albania and called on
the political parties to show restraint. The NATO Secretary-General called for a "return
to a peaceful and stable situation"s8.
Berisha's immunitv lvas lifted by the People's Assembly- thereby clearing the way for
his arrest on charges of seeking to overthrow the government.
An international delegation from the OSCE held talks with Albanian politicians from all
the parties in Tirana.
Ahmet Krasniqi5e, a leading member of the self-styled ethnic Albanian "Govemment" in
Kosovo, was shot dead in Tirana.
MAPE's current strength was 82 officers from23 WEU countries, under the command
of Colonel Alain Labrot of the French Gendarmerie.
UN Securit-v Council Resolution I199 demanded a ceasefire in Kosovo. the withdrawal
of Serbian troops and the beginning of direct negotiations.
The joint OSCE, EU, Council of Europe and WEU Declaration on Albania accused
Sali Berisha's Democratic Party of contributing, by its tactics and rhetoric, to nelv
forms of violence6o.
Zlatan Kikic, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in Yugoslavia was accused, in an
official report entitled "Terrorism in Kosovo and Albania", of hosting recruitment and
training centres for terrorists on Yugoslav territory. According to him, "Albanian armed
forces took part directly" in these activities.
Friends of Albania group founded.
Prime Minister Fatos Nano resigned.
President Rexhep Mejdani asked Pandeli Majko, the 3l year-old Secretary-General of
the ruling Socialist ParU, to form a new government.
The WEU Council of Ministers examined the revised study produced by the Military
Staff6r.
Five Yugoslav servicemen were killed in the rvestern part of Kosovo by shooting from
Albania.
Inaugural meeting in Brussels ofthe "Friends of Albania" group . promoted by Italy.
October
Albanian terrorists attacked a border post killing 4 Yugoslav servicemen.
President Rexhep Mejdani swore in a new goverilnent, led by Pandeli Majko who
became Albania's youngest Prime Minister.
A Yugoslav army border post in the south-west of Kosovo was attacked by a grenade-
launcher from Albanian territory.
The Albanian Minister for Foreign AfFairs, Paskal Milo, said at the UN General
Assunbly that he was in favour of "an immediate NATO intervention". He added that
5t European Parliament, Delegation for relations wirlr south-east Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Security and Defence Poliry. Background note on Albania,T October 1998.
s'Ahmed Krasniqi was the Chief of the Republic of Kosovo's armed forces (FARK). The FARK were set up by
Ibrahim Rugova's close friends to counter the KLA. They had the support of the Americans and the Turks and
were probably based in the southern part of the country. Le lv.Ionde DiplomatiEte, February 1999.
60 European Parliament, Delegation for relations with south-east Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Security and Defence Policy. Background note on Albania, T October 1998.tr Following an earlier request from the EU, based on Article J.4.2 of the Maastricht Treaty, WEU submitted to
the EU a feasibility study on possible options for an international police operation in Albania (strengthened
presence of MAPE). lilEU and crisis management in the Balkans, report submitted on behalf of the Political
Committee by Mr Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1627,9 Novemberl998.
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Albania called for the presence of international observers in Kosovo and that his
government considered Slobodan Milosevic "responsible for genocide".
Albania accused Serbian forces of firing machine guns and throwing grenades at a
village in the Has district in the northem part of the country, in order to draw Tirana
into a lvider conflict in the Balkans.
The Albanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paskal Milo. on a visit to Athens, wanted to
find a solution for Kosovo similar to the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Albania said it was ready to put its military bases at NATO's disposal if an allied
intervention against Yugoslavia occurred.
lncident on the Albanian border: a border post lvas the target of shots fired from an
Albanian army observation post. According to a press release, these were followed by
an attempt by "several Albanian terrorists" to enter Yugoslavia illegally from Albania.
The People's Assembly approved the new cabinet. The opposition Democratic Party
maintained its boycott of the Assembly.
The new Prime Minister announced that he would draft a new constitution and called
for a peaceful solution in Kosovo, by openly supporting the pacifist Kosovar leader,
Ibrahim Rugova.
Albania protested to Yugoslavia after several incidents occurred on the borders of the
two countries.
NATO's 16 member states presented the Yugoslav President with an ultimatum, asking
him to comply with the terms of UN Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998 or
Yugoslavia would be bombed.
Albania said it was ready to put its air and sea space at NATO's disposal for a possible
military operation in Kosovo. The lnterior Ministry announced that the Albanian border
guards had been ordered to open fire on any Yugoslav soldier who tried to enter
Albanian territory.
President Rexhep Mejdani, on a visit to Germany, said he was in favour of a NATO
military intervention in Kosovo.
Tirana rvelcomed the agreement reached by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic
and American emissary Richard Holbrooke on the way to solve the Kosovo crisis.
The Albanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paskal Milo, supported the agreement on
Kosovo and stressed the fact that Albania's support would be "strictly political". It
refused to take part in the OSCE verification mission.
An Albanian from FYROM was killed on the Albanian border by Macedonian border
guards.
The Socialist Party-dominated People's Assembly approved a newly drafted
constitution and agreed to put it to a countrywide referendum on 22 November.
A new party, the Albanian Civil Party, was formed.
International meeting of senior officials in Rome to take stock of the situation in
Albania.
NATO suspended its threat of air strikes to solve the Kosovo issue.
lnternational Conference on Albania in Tirana. WEU undertook to support, through
MAPE, the current process of stabilisation and democratisation in Albania.
November
The ltalian Government decided to send a further contingent of police at the beginning
of January 1999, bringing the total force up to 500. and to increase Italian patrols on
the Mediterranean coast of Albania62.
Two mortar shells fired in Kosovo fell on Albania.
U2RID 3/19. p.09.
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l0/ll/1998 Three people were arrested as they were preparing a murder attempt on President
Mejdani.
The Prime Minister Pandeli Majko on his first visit abroad signed a memorandum of
understanding with the Italian Prime Minister, Mr D'Alema, designed to strengthen
cooperation between the two countries in the areas of security, reorganisation of the
Albanian police, and the fight against crime63.
PMG recommendation on a mid-term review of the current MAPE mandates.
12lllll998 Prime Minister Pandeli Majko on a visit to Athens, said that there was a "dangerous
void", a "neither peace, nor war sifuation" in Kosovo which "required immediate
interyention".
Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis told his Albanian countelpart that Greece was
prepared to help Albania in its relations with the European Union, NATO, WEU and
any other international organisation.
Following the issue of an initial planning directive by the Council, a draft contingency plan and a
declaration of intent request message were drawn up and, with the approval of the Council, circulated
to the lilEU nations on l3 November 199865.
20lllll998 The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Janos Martonyi, Chairman of the Commiuee of
Ministers of the 4O-member Council of Europe, appealed for the widest possible
participation in the referendum on Albania's new Constitution to be held on 22
November 199866.
22/ll/1998 The constitution was approved by referendum.
25lllll998 Another ltalo-Albanian summit: Prime Minister Pandeli Majko met Mr D'Alema at
Bari.
28lllll998 President Rexhep Mejdani signed the country's first post-communist constitution into
law.
30lll/1998 International development conference for Albania held in Tirana. Representatives of
western countries and international organisations 
- 
among them the OSCE, the World
Bank, the EU and the United States 
- 
issued a joint statement which urged the
government 'to take concrete measures to restore law and order throughout the
country" and "to protect private investments and foreign personnel".
December
2/1211998 The OSCE representative in Albania, Daan Everts, rejected Belgrade's accusations
about the international community's contacts rvith KLA etlrnic Albanian separatists.
Albania said it was ready to cooperate with the international community to resolve tle
situation in Kosovo.
4ll2ll998 The Albanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paskal Milo, on a visit to Athens, thought
it "essential" to maintain a NATOled military "threat" to solve the Kosovo crisis.
The Albanian Prime Minister, Mr Pandeli Majko, visited WEU Headquarters to meet
the Secretary-General, Mr Jose Cutileiro, and members of the WEU Permanent
Council6T.
u'RD 3t99,p.69Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Memorandum of Understanding on consultation and
assistance between the two Ministries of the Interior for a period of one year exlended the scope of application
of the previous MOU of 17 September 1997.
a Second part of the 44th annual report of the Council to the Assembly on the Council's activities (1 July-3l
December 1998); Assembly Document 1641, 8 April 1999.
65 Second part of the 44th annual report of the Council to the Assembly on the Council's activities (1 July-3l
December 1998); Assembly Document 1641, 8April 1999.6 http://www .coe.fr I cpt 98/7 65aoh2898o/o29.htm.
u' http://www.weu.int/englpress/p98 I 202a. htm.
40
APPENDICES DOCLIMENT 1650
t2-t3ltzlt998
t4/121t998
t9/t211998
2111211998
28/12/1998
12/0111999
t5l}Ut999
t8/0U1999
22/0U1999
2610111999
28/0y1999
Belgrade "protested vigorously" to Albania, after an incident during which 8 Albanians
r,vere killed by Yugoslav border guards.
The Secretary-General of WEU, Mr Josd Cutileiro, visited Tirana.
Shooting of 36 KLA guerrillas in the Albanian border zone by Yugoslav forces who
claimed the KLA men were smuggling arms into Kosovo.
Yugoslav soldiers crossed Kosovo into Albania and fired into the village of Zharke.
The Albanian Interior Ministry said Yugoslav troops had opened fire on an Albanian
military unit near Tropoja.
Prime Minister Pandeli Majko met opposition leader Sali Berisha on 2l December to
discuss ways of resolving a hunger strike by about 70 students demanding better
government grants and accommodation, which had been supported by Berisha. They
also discussed the Kosovo crisis and the investigation into the assassination of
Democrat politician Azem Hajdari.
The People's Assembly called for a NATO-led intervention in Kosovo.
1999
January
Adoption of an Action Plan for Legal and Judicial Reform, prepared in cooperation with the Council
of B,rrope and the European Commission.
Release of eight Serbian soldiers held hostage in Kosovo by Albanian members of the
KLA independence movement.
45 Albanians were killed in Racak, a village in Kosovo. Serbian authorities said the
victims lvere not civilians but KLA army militants.
Belgrade decided to expel monitoring mission chief. William Walker, from Kosovo.
The Contact Group on the former Yugoslavia (United States, Russia, France, lIK,
Germany and Italy) met in Rome.
Sali Berisha, Chairman of the Democratic Party proposed an anti-crime pact.
The French and ltalian Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Hubert V6drine and Lamberto
Dini, announced that the following day in London, the Contact Group on the former
Yugoslavia would address, a "solemn command" to the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians
to start negotiating an autonomous status for this Serbian province. Sanctions against
KLA separatists would consist in forbidding any supply of weapons or financial
support. To achieve this, pressure would be put on neighbouring countries, especially
Albania, and "military measures" would be set up. The ltalian Minister said that Italy
and all EU countries "should do everything to pressurise the neighbouring countries,
including Albania."
29/0111999 Prime Minister Pandeli Majko said that Albania was strengthening its military
equipment on the border with Kosovo.
Further massacre in Kosovo: 24 were killed in Rogovo.
The Contact Group on Kosovo, meeting in London, adopted the principles and
fundamental points to be tabled at the Rambouillet Conference.
3010111999 A hail of bullets was fired during the night of 29-30 January into a hydraulic power
station, in the northern part of Albania, only a few kilometres away from the border
with Kosovo.
The Chairman of the Democratic Party, Sali Berisha, called on Albanians to participate
in the Rambouillet meeting. He also called on the US and the member countries of the
North Atlantic Alliance to decide on intervention and the immediate deployment of
military units in Kosovo.
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U02/1999
2/02n999
41021t999
610211999
91021t999
1810211999
1910211999
221021t999
2410211999
231021t999
2610211999
U0311999
2103n999
February
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Erik Derycke, lvent to Tirana to discuss the
Kosovo crisis with Albanian leaders.
US Defense Secretary William Cohen said the Europeans should "bear the brunt" of
any operation in Kosovo and that American participation should be "as little as
possible".
The Permanent Council of WEU adopted an emergency plan for an intemational police
operation in Albania, based on one of the options defined in the WEU feasibility study.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright held talks with Albanian Prime Minister Pandeli
Majko on economic issues, regional democracy and the Kosovo crisis. The Secretary of
State asked Mr Majko to "take part. with Albanian leaders from Kosovo, KLA
included in the peace talks to be held at the end of that week in France (Rambouillet)
In the presentafion of the German Presidurcy's progranrme at the meetings of the WEU
Assunbly's Presidential, Political and Defence Committees at WEU Headquarters in
Brussels, it was stated on the subject of current WEU operations that the time had come
to take the necessary decisions, which would be binding on WEU and the EU, regarding
the WEU police mission in Albania on the basis of "option2 (a)"6t.
Kosovo peace talks started nthe Chdteau de Rambouillet, near Paris.
Prime Minister Pandeli Majko noted that the Albanian Government would make its
military facilities available to NATO troops for any peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.
He also told journalists that "if the massacres in Kosovo continue ... all Albanians in
the Balkans 
- 
in Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro 
- 
have the right to
collective self-defence".
The Albanian Government set up a special working group following the kidnapping of
Vlore's police chief by smugglers.
NATO forces mobilised as the Kosovo deadline approached.
Deadline for agreement between Serbian and ethnic Albanian negotiators, decided by
the international community.
Heavy fightrng in northern Kosovo.
The Friends of Albania met in Vienna to review recent developments in key sectors in
Albania and to discuss what progress had been made and what still remained to be done
by the government with appropriate backing from the intemational community.
End ofthe Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo.
The Yugoslav anny fired mortar shells and missiles in the Bukos region in the north of
Kosovo. There were two casualties among the Albanian population.
Murch
United Nations peacekeepers were obliged to stop monitoring FYROM's borders with
Kosovo and Albania, following China's veto of a Security Council Resolution that
would have renewed their mandate6e.
The radical Kosovar leader, Adem Demaqi, who had boycotted the Rambouillet
meeting, resigned from his post as political representative of the Kosovo Liberation
Army.
6 Minutes of the meeting of the WEU Assembly's Presidential, Political and Defence Committees, held at
WEU Headquarters in Brussels on 4 February 1999 A/WEU/CP/POL/DEF(99) CR 2, Paris, 5 March 1999;
Appendix I to the progamme of the German Presidency of WEU presented by Ambassador Hoffstetter and
General Wiesmann.
ue The UN Preventive Deployment force 
- 
1050 Americans, Scandinavians and Indonesians 
- 
had been in
FYROM since 1993.
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3t03fi999
410311999
810311999
9t03/1999
t0/0311999
tu03lt999
tsl03l1999
Yugoslav Army forces held their position along Kosovo's southern border with
FYROM, forcing thousands of Albanian villagers to flee. Tank, anti-aircraft gun and
artillery movements around the border town of Djeneral Jankovic and attacks on
mountain villages prompted the KLA to move its own soldiers into the area.
Six KLA representatives were invited to Washington before the resumption of
negotiations on Kosovo, due to start on 15 March. The invitation did not include Adem
Demaqi who was hostile to the peace plan proposed by the great powers.
In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, thousands of British troops were
assembling with tanks and artillery for a peacekeeping operation across the Yugoslav
border.
The United Nations said the fighting had driven I 200 ethnic Albanian refugees to flee
to FYROM since 26 February. A further 4 000 ethnic Albanians had been expelled
from their homes in the area and most had taken refuge with friends and family.
The town of Brcko, in Serbian Bosnia was declared ''neutral territory".
Tony Blair, speaking at a conference at the Royal United Services lnstitute in London,
warned President Milosevic that he would be held accountable for suspected war crimes
if any more atrocities occurred in Kosovo. Blair urged the KLA "to cease its operations
and accept demilitarisation" and the Serbs to reduce their forces to agreed levels and
allow Nato-led troops in.
The Italian Parliament ratified the Agreement between the Italian and Albanian
Governments on cooperation in defence matters, concluded in Rome on 13 October
lgg570.
A new MAPE training centre was officially opened in Durres. Its opening marked the
extension of MAPE's activities beyond its original base in Tirana and was firmly within
the framework of the new mission it was preparing to undertake. The Durres training
centre would concentrate on special training in criminal investigation, traffic and border
policing, and maintaining law and orderTr.
The Council of the European Union adopted a common action plan, based on Article
J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the European Union contribution to the
restoration of a viable police force in Albania.
The Council of the European Union took a decision, adopted on the basis of Article
J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union, whereby the European Union called on WEU to
implement its common action plann on the European Union contribution to the
restoration of a viable police force in Albania by applying the "extended option 2" of
the WEU feasibility study in accordance with the objective set out in Article 1.1 of the
common action plan.
The NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, proposed a specific "partnership for
prosperity", the idea being that the Alliance could contribute towards a comprehensive
aid programme for the Balkans.
The EU Council formally adopted a conrmon action plan on the EU contribution to the
restoration of a viable police force in Albania and a Decision formally requesting WEU
to implement if.
Kosovo peace negotiations resumed at Evreux.
7o Law no 48 of l8 February 1999, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale No. 55 of 8 March 1999. The Agreement
signed by the Italian and Albanian Defence Ministers in Rome on 13 October 1995 covered, in particular, the
sectors for cooperation, for example training and practical instruction, assistance in the areas of technical
logistics, health, meteorology, advice on hydrography and cartography, civil defence and military indusory,
exchanges of information on the organisation of defence in the maritime sector.
" Since its mission started in spring 1997, MAPE has trained some 2 000 Albanian policemen, WEU press
release, Brussels, 9 March 1999.
'2 Common action plan 1999/189/CFSP of 9 March 1999.
" This common action will be funded out of the Community budget to an amount of €2)million.
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29/03/1999
3010311999
3U03/t999
Kosovar Albanians signed a peace deal calling for interim autonomy and 2E 000 NATO
troops to implement it. The Serb delegation refused and the talks rvere suspended.
US special envoy Richard Holbrooke warned Milosevic of air strikes unless he signed
peace agreements. Milosevic refu sed.
NATO authorised air strikes. Yugoslavia declared a state of emergency.
NATO launched air attacks on Yugoslavia in a bid to curb a Serbian offensive in
Kosovo and weaken the military apparatus of Slobodan Milosevic. Russia called for a
meeting of the UN Security Council, recalled its military representative at NATO and
suspended cooperation with NATO.
NATO gave written insurances to the five countries bordering on Serbia, namely
Albania- Bulgaria. FYROM, Slovenia and Romania.
Belgrade broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, the United Kingdom.
France and Germany. The Italian Embassy remained open.
NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, arnounced in Brussels that the Atlantic
Council had authorised the transition to phase 2 of the plan of attack on Serbian forces
(bombing militar-v concentrations in the area betlveen Belgrade and the border with
FYROM and Albania).
About 20 000 ethnic Albanian refugees poured into Albania.
Thousands of refugees flooded into Albania and FYROM from Kosovo.
NATO accused Belgrade of planning systematic "genocide" in Kosovo.
Albania asked NATO to send troops into Kosovo.
Albanian President Rexhep Mejdani called on NATO to deploy ground troops in
Kosovo.
According to Albanian reports, not confirmed by NATO, five Albanian leaders,
including Rambouillet negotiator Fehmi Agani, had been executed.
The Italian Prime Minister. Mr D'Alema, received a message from UN High
Commissioner Sadakho Hogata, requesting permission for an Italian humanitarian
mission to the refugees in Albania.
The Albanian Ambassador to Italy, Leontiev Cuci- met the Italian Minister for the
lnterior, Rosa Russo Jervolino, to ask for humanitarian aid.
The Italian Government launched "Operation Rainbow".
The Russian Prime Minister, Yevgenv Primakov, had talks with Milosevic in Belgrade.
President Milosevic offered to withdraw some of his forces from Kosovo if NATO
stopped its bombing campaign. NATO rejected Milosevic's offer as inadequate.
Albania's Foreign Minister urged Kosovar Albanians to remain at home and "resist"
what he called the Serb genocide.
The Albanian Ambassador to the UN, Agim Nastr. claimed that ''all the (Kosovar
Albanian) men lvho had been captured had been executed or put into concentration
camps". Nash said that the KLA should be armed and that there was no altemative to
complete independence for Kosovo.
He also appealed for international aid in coping with the influx of refugees from
Kosovo. Albania had already accepted an estimated 65 000 to 100 000 refugees since
NATO air strikes began.
Albania accused Yugoslav forces of firing on two Albanian border villages where
refugees from Kosovo were being housed.
Albanian TV said the KLA had ordered a general mobilisation of its forces.
April
l/0411999 The President of the WEU Assembly, Lluis Maria de Puig, said that all the
responsibility lay with the Milosevic regime. He supported NATO's action and called
on the dual German Presidency of WEU and EU to consider tasking WEU with
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organising and implementing the necessary humanitarian assistance to and evacuation
of refugeesT+.
The Albanian leaders lvho had been reported executed were found to be still alive.
According to Associated Press, the KLA had started a campaign to encourage voung
Albanian men rvho had fled to Albania to return to Kosovo and join the KLA.
Mr Josselin. the French Minister of State for cooperation and francophone affairs with
responsibility for humanitarian action, rvent to Tirana and Skopje rvhere he visited
refugee reception centres and met the Albanian and FYROM authorities and
representatives of the international organisations and NGOs responsible for organising
aid.
The Albanian, Bosnian, FYROM, Hungarian and Slovenian Foreign Ministers met EU
representatives in Bonn to discuss the situation of the refugees.
The European Union gave assurances to Albania, Montenegro and FYROM.
Meeting befiveen Ibrahim Rugova and Slobodan Milosevic.
2/0411999 Albania and Macedonia said they were ovenvhelmed by the influx of Kosovar refugees.
The Atlantic Council meeting in Bntssels announced its decision to deploy 6-8000 men on the border
between Albania and Kosovo to protect the humanitarian assistance.
3/0411999 The President of the WEU Assembly, Lluis Maria de Puig, in an intervierv with the
German Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping, expressed WEU's support for the action
taken by NATO and its lvillingness to lend assistance to the humanitarian organisations.
4/0411999 President Bill Clinton ordered the deployment of 24 Apache fighter helicopters to
Albania.
610411999 Serbia declared a unilateral ceasefire for its forces in Kosovo but this lvas rejected by
the NATO allies as inadequate. The air offensive rvould continue until Serbian troops
left the province and until international guarantees had been put in place for the
refugees to return home.
Albania redoubled its efforts to secure international financial aid to face the cost of
sheltering the refugees.
Albanian President Rexhep Mejdani denounced the Yugoslav ceasefire and offered full
collaboration with NATO.
7104/1999 The OSCE reported that Yugoslavia had closed the Morina border crossing between
Kosovo and Albania and had said it was safe for the refugees to return home.
President Yeltsin sent messages to several foreign leaders in an attempt to end the
conflict.
8-9/04199 Meeting of political coordinators ofthe G8 industfialised nations in Dresden.
810411999 The Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Luxembourg was enlarged to include the
eight countries close to the conflict, the EIB. the EBRD, the World Bank, the IMF, the
HC& the OSCE, the Council of Europe and WEU.
Albanian Foreign Minister Paskal Milo said that NATO forces could be deployed in his
country to launch attacks on Yugoslavia.
According to Serbian news agencies, hundreds of KLA guerrillas attempted to advance
into Kosovo lvith the backing of Albanian regular army forces.
9104/1999 LJNCHCR reported that Serb forces had laid mines at the border with Albania and were
moving up tanks and guns near the border.
NATO announced it was qending 8 000 troops to the Balkans to aid the flood of
refugees from Kosovo75.
'o WEU Assembly press release 7lgg, I April 1999.
's Operation Allied Harbour will be a coordinated military exercise involving 14 countries, controlled by a
''mobile force land headquarters" based in Albania. The troops rvill be deployed as Allied Command Europe
Mobile Force Land (ACE). Based at Heidelberg. Germany, it rvill be under the command of British Major
General John Reith, formerly of the Parachute Regiment.
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Yugoslavia reopened its border wittr Albania and allowed approximately 2 000 people
to cross the main border checkpoint near Morina, Albania.
Yugoslavia said guerrillas were using bases in Albania; Albania said villages had been
hit by cross-border shelling.
In an interview with Albanian state television. Albanian Prime Minister Pandeli Majko
said that "no one should fear the creation of a Greater Albania or independent Kosovo".
He also admitted that the Albanian Government had nwer obstructed the KLA.
Two civilians, two KLA guerrillas and four Albanian border guards were wounded in
northern Albania. Later in the day, three KLA guerrillas and a journalist were injured in
Tropoje, in Albania.
The Albanian Government accused Yugoslavia of a grave violation of the territorial
integntv of the Republic of Albania. The Albanian Minister for the lnterior, Petro Koci,
said that the villages of Padesh. Kamenik4 Lugu I Zi and, Tropoje had been attacked by
Serb mortars and that 'T{ATO needed to intervene to neutralise the Serb artillery near
the border with Albania because it had been firing in the direction of Albanian territory
in the last few days."
Foreign Minister Paskal Milo, during a joint news conference with British Foreign
Secretary Robin Cook, declared that Albania had decided to give NATO the right to
control all its airspace, ports and any other military infrastructures in the country.
Albania accused Yugoslavia of trying to spread the conflict beyond its borders.
4 800 more refugees arrived in Albania.
Incursion by Serb troops into Albanian territory near the town of Kremica (confirmed
by OSCE observer Andrea Angeli).
Albanian Prime Minister, Pandeli Majko, held an emergency meeting with Defence
Minister Luan Hajdaraga and Albanian Army Chief of Staff Aleks Andoni to discuss
the incursion.
According to the latest HCR census, there were estimated to be 314000 Kosovar
refugees in Albania.
Yugoslavia broke off diplomatic relations with Albania, accusing Tirana of siding with
NATO.
US Apache fighter helicopters arrive in Albania.
Further armed clashes on the border between Albania and Kosovo. NATO evacuated
the Kukes camp.
The Albanian President, Rexhep Mejdani, in an interview with Le Figaro, said he
thought a NATO force should be deployed without a prior peace agreement and that
Kosovo should remain "undivided and multi-etlnic".
Declaration of support for Albania and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the
summit celebrating NATO's 50th anniversary.
The Albanian Public Order Ministry reported a further incident during the night
behveen Serb and Albanian forces on the border.
Pentagon officials said additional troops (2 050) would join 3 300 US soldiers already
in Albania or on the way.
Jacques Mouchet of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees asked the
President of the WEU Assembly to strengthen the WEU police force.
The French Finance Ministry reported that the Paris Club had allowed Albania and
FYROM to defer debt repayrnents to 3l March 200076.
Reports coming out of Albania indicated that Serb artillery was bombarding the towns
of Padesh and Kamenice in Tropoja.
The President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, announced the allocation of US$
70 millionto assist Albania and FYROM.
'u Albania's foreign debt is approximatelv US$ 900 million at present.
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